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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on Innovation and Consumer Credit.
In Chapter 2, I examine the relationship between the number and quality of
patents at both the aggregate and industry level. I find a negative relation-
ship at the aggregate level that, surprisingly, vanishes at the industry level. I
reconcile the aggregate and industry relationships by considering interactions
between industries. The average correlation between the number of patents
in one industry and the quality of patents in another industry turns out to be
negative. I propose that the inter-industry relationship results from the out-
puts of each industry being complements in the production of goods. When the
quality of available ideas improves in one industry, the output of that industry
will increase, which leads to increased demand in the complementary industry.
This increases the returns from inventing in the second industry, and results
in their inventors developing ideas below the prior quality threshold. I develop
a multi-industry innovation model to capture this mechanism. I also provide
evidence that the inter-industry relationship strengthens with a measure of
complementarities between any two industries.
These findings suggest that production complementarities between indus-
tries are an important determinant of innovation, which had not been previ-
ously considered. They also contribute to the current debate on U.S. patent
policy, where there is a growing belief among scholars and practitioners that
the quality of patents has declined during their recent surge in number. This
viewpoint largely attributes the surge in patents to their increased value in
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deterring competition. Instead, I use the model to demonstrate that such a
decline could be explained by increased innovative opportunities in certain in-
dustries and the corresponding response of complementary industries.
Chapter 3 investigates the key factors driving cyclical fluctuations in Cana-
dian consumer insolvency filings, with a focus on the 2008-09 recession where
insolvencies jumped by nearly 50%. Our analysis uses historical data at the na-
tional, provincial and city levels, as well as a micro-level analysis which makes
use of filer-level data from a unique dataset of Canadian insolvency filers from
2005-11. We find that the direct effect of adverse income shocks (unemploy-
ment) accounts for roughly half the cyclical volatility of filings, while shifts
in “lending standards” account for roughly a quarter. We also document an
increase in the share of filers with “middle-class” characteristics during the
recession – a larger fraction of filers are homeowners, live with a spouse or
a partner, have student loans, earn larger incomes and are middle-aged. Fur-
thermore, the average outstanding total debt of filers is larger during the reces-
sion, suggesting that either income shocks are hitting middle-class individuals
disproportionately more, or that rolling-over large debts became more difficult
due to tighter lending standards. Interestingly, fluctuations in house prices
at the city level are highly correlated with insolvency rates over the business
cycle, suggesting that household balance sheets also play a role in the cyclical
fluctuations of filings.
In chapter 4 we examine the large countercyclical fluctuations in U.S. bankruptcy
filings and real credit card interest rates. In contrast to the prediction of stan-
dard consumption smoothing models, unsecured credit is pro-cyclical. To quan-
tify the contribution of shocks to income and lending standards in accounting
for the cyclical patterns in consumer credit markets, we introduce aggregate
fluctuations into a heterogeneous agent life-cycle incomplete market model
with a U.S. style bankruptcy regime. Aggregate fluctuations change the proba-
bility of persistent shocks to household earnings, with the likelihood of negative
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income shocks increasing in recessions. We find that income fluctuations and
endogenous borrowing constraints alone cannot generate cyclicality of debt to
income and the volatility of filings and interest rates. Incorporating counter-
cyclical intermediate shocks to the cost of lending helps the model match both
volatilities, but not the debt pro-cyclicality.
iv
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This work contributes to the areas of innovation and consumer credit. My dis-
sertation consists of three chapters in macroeconomics. Chapter 2 examines
the role of cross-sector complementarities in driving the observed patterns of
innovation activity in the United States economy. Chapters 3 and 4 study con-
sumer credit, and in particular, bankruptcy. These chapters are coauthored
with Professors Igor Livshits and Jim MacGee. Chapter 3 is an empirical paper
examining the drivers of bankruptcy filings using Canadian data. In chapter 4
a quantitative macroeconomic model explains consumers’ decisions to declare
bankruptcy and how this is impacted in a recession. The model is then cal-
ibrated to fit the observed patterns of bankruptcies in United States. Each
chapter documents new empirical facts. Chapters 2 and 4 also provide new
economic models to try to explain these new findings.
Innovation is often consider as the engine of economic growth. In Chapter
22, I show that the economy’s production structure plays an important role in
determining innovation. Using patent data, I document a set of empirical facts
that are initially puzzling. I examine the relationship between the number and
quality of patents at both the aggregate and industry level. I find a negative
relationship at the aggregate level that, surprisingly, vanishes at the industry
level. I reconcile the aggregate and industry relationships by considering in-
teractions between industries. The average correlation between the number of
patents in one industry and the quality of patents in another industry turns
out to be negative. These interactions between industries make it difficult to
interpret innovation data. A negative relationship between the number and
quality of patents exists at the aggregate level and is widely seen to support
the notion that patent counts largely reflect changes in rent-seeking behav-
ior. However, focusing on the aggregate relationship between the number and
quality of patents, ignores important inter-industry interactions. Specifically,
the number and quality of patents are uncorrelated within industries. It is
these inter-industry interactions, which drive the difference between the two
relationships.
I propose that the inter-industry relationship results from the outputs of
each industry being complements in the production of goods. When the quality
of available ideas improves in one industry, the output of that industry will in-
crease, which leads to increased demand in the complementary industry. This
increases the returns from inventing in the second industry, and results in
3their inventors developing ideas below the prior quality threshold. I develop
a multi-industry innovation model to capture this mechanism. I also provide
evidence that the inter-industry relationship strengthens with a measure of
complementarities between any two industries.
Chapter 3 investigates the key factors that drive cyclical fluctuations in
Canadian consumer insolvency filings, with a focus on the 2008-09 recession
which witnessed an almost 50% above its pre-recession level. A natural expla-
nation for the rise in insolvencies during recessions is an increased frequency
of negative income shocks, manifested partly in the increased unemployment
rate. Adverse income shocks place additional financial strain on debtors, which
may make insolvency more likely. Another important mechanism comes from
the supply side, as lenders may tighten their “lending standards” during reces-
sions due to higher perceived risk of lending or higher internal cost of funds.
More limited access to credit could makes it harder for borrowers to roll-over
existing loans or lead to higher interest rates for riskier borrowers, which could
result in an increase in insolvencies.
We investigate the quantitative contribution of these two channels using
aggregate data on insolvency filings, unemployment rates, debt levels, and key
interest rates at the national, and city levels. Our empirical analysis finds
support for both mechanisms, as both the unemployment rate and the finan-
cial market variables are statistically significant in explaining the variation
in insolvency filings. The results are broadly consistent whether we consider
4national level (annual or shorter quarterly series), or city level data. Interest-
ingly, fluctuations in house prices at the city level seem to be related to fluc-
tuations in the insolvency rates. Since home equity is the main asset of many
households, changes in house prices could significantly impact the amount that
households could borrow.
We use a unique dataset of insolvency filings in Canada that was provided
by the Office Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB) to investigate how (and if)
the characteristics of filers vary over the business cycle. These data also sug-
gest that both adverse income and credit market conditions played a role in
the rise in filings during the 2008-09 recession. We document that the fraction
of unemployed among the filers does increase during the recession. A rough
back-of-the-envelope analysis suggests that as much as a half of the rise in
insolvencies may be due to increased unemployment. We also document an
increase in the share of filers with “middle class” characteristics during the
recession - a larger fraction of filers are homeowners, live with a spouse or a
partner, have student loans, earn larger incomes, and are middle-aged. The
average outstanding debts of filers are larger during the recession, supporting
the hypothesis that rolling-over large debts became more difficult due either to
tighter “lending standards” or to increased cost of funds.
These shifts in characteristics are broadly consistent with simple economic
theory. As one would expect, unemployed filers became more prevalent dur-
ing the recession. The increase in filers with “middle class” characteristics
5suggests that the high levels of unemployment during the recent recession im-
pacted households with stronger labour force attachment, who would during
more usual economic times have a low probability of extended periods of un-
employment. Simple economic theory suggests that the filers most affected by
a tightening of “lending standards” are those with higher debt levels. This re-
flects both the fact that higher debt levels makes these households more vulner-
able to higher interest rates (i.e., larger risk premia on loans to riskier borrow-
ers) or to a tightening of credit lines which makes it more difficult to roll-over
their debt. This mechanism also leads to more filers in a recession with ”middle
class” characteristics (such as higher levels of education and home ownership),
since these characteristics are often a prerequisite for initial access to large
amounts of credit.
In Chapter 4, I along with Professors Igor Livshits and Jim MacGee docu-
ment that there are large countercyclical fluctuations in U.S. bankruptcy filings
and real credit card interest rates, while unsecured credit is pro-cyclical. In this
chapter, we document the facts and ask whether the predictions of incomplete
market models with bankruptcy are consistent with these facts. We introduce
aggregate fluctuations into a heterogeneous agent life-cycle incomplete market
model with a U.S. style bankruptcy regime. Household borrowing is priced by
competitive financial intermediaries who can observe households earnings, age
and current asset holdings. Aggregate fluctuations change the probability of
persistent shocks to household earnings, with the likelihood of negative shocks
6increasing in recessions. This leads to asymmetric effects of credit pricing on
different household types over the business cycles, since interest rates vary en-
dogenously with borrowers default risk. The model is calibrated to match key
features of the U.S. economy and bankruptcy system and cyclical movements
in income.
We use the model to decompose the driving forces behind cyclical fluctua-
tions in the consumer credit market and their impact on defaults. In particu-
lar, we seek to identify the impact of changes the composition of borrower risk
on average interest rate and borrowing. The standard framework is found to
miss the data in a couple dimensions. When the only source of aggregate un-
certainty is income fluctuations, the calibrated model dramatically understates
the volatility of bankruptcies and borrowing interest rates, and generates coun-
tercyclical borrowing. The increase in aggregate debt during recessions comes
primarily from the extensive margin, as more households choose to borrow as
a result of negative income shocks. The introduction of intermediation shocks
during recessions reduces the gap between the model and the data, as we find
that intermediation shocks can generate pro-cyclical borrowing and increase
the volatility of both filings and interest rates. However, the benchmark model
still significantly understates the volatility of bankruptcy filings.
7Chapter 2
Innovation and Production
Complementarities
2.1 Introduction
Innovation is widely considered the engine of economic growth.1 In order to
promote innovation, patent rights are awarded to those who invent. However,
it is difficult to interpret changes in the number of granted patents. The trou-
ble is that patent counts could reflect both the level of innovative output and
the patent system at the time of application. As Figure 2.1 shows, U.S. patents
have surged in number since the mid-1980s. Instead of attributing this surge to
more innovation, many scholars and practitioners believe that changes to the
patent system are responsible. For instance, Jaffe and Lerner [2004] contend
that several bureaucratic changes unintentionally made patents both easier to
secure and more beneficial to hold for rent-seeking purposes. The implication
1Romer [1990] or Aghion and Howitt [1992] are two prominent examples of innovation’s role
in economic growth.
8is that the “quality” of the marginal invention associated with a patent has
declined. Consequently, this viewpoint suggests that over time the number
of patents is negatively correlated with average patent quality (i.e. average
associated invention quality). If there truly is such a correlation, there are
profound implications for patent policy. Any social benefit from stronger in-
centives for invention must be weighed against the losses in consumer welfare
which result from additional monopoly pricing [Nordhaus, 1969]. This nega-
tive correlation implies that there are diminishing benefits to awarding more
patents. Furthermore, this correlation is consistent with the notion that patent
counts rise from additional rent-seeking behavior. In particular, it is conven-
tionally believed that the patents used to deter competitors are of particularly
low-quality [Federal Trade Commission, 2003].2 As a result – if the number
and average quality of patents are negatively correlated over time – it is more
likely that total welfare declines when the number of patents rises.
Using a standard proxy for patent quality, I compare the number and qual-
ity of patents over time, only to arrive at a puzzling set of observations. At
the aggregate level, the number of patents is negatively correlated with aver-
age patent quality, which is consistent with patents being used to seek rents.
However, I find that number and quality are uncorrelated within industries.
The negative relationship between number and quality disappears as the clas-
sification of industries used in the comparisons becomes finer. By the 3-digit
2More generally, patent protection is thought to discourage competition [Boldrin and Levine,
2008]. However, Aghion and Prantl. [2013] makes the case that this relationship may not be
robust.
9Figure 2.1: Annual U.S. Patent Grants
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Standard Industry Classification, there is no statistically significant relation-
ship between the number and average quality of patents. In contrast to the
aggregate relationship, the industry-level evidence challenges the view that
patent counts largely reflect changes in rent-seeking behavior.
More importantly, the relationship between patent number and quality dif-
fers when measured at the aggregate and industry level, because there are
10
significant and previously unrecognized interactions between industries. The
correlation between patent number in one industry and average patent quality
in another industry is typically negative. In fact, 91% of the aggregate relation-
ship is due to this type of co-movement. To explain this inter-industry relation-
ship, I propose that innovation decisions are related between industries due to
the economy’s production structure. In particular, I argue that innovation in
one industry alters the returns from inventing in complementary industries.
While it is well-established that innovative activities respond to changes in de-
mand from other industries [Scherer, 1982], to the best of my knowledge, this
is the first paper to consider how innovation decisions are linked between in-
dustries. I provide evidence for this novel relationship by relating the patent
data to a measure of industry complementarities that I construct. I develop
a simple multi-industry innovation model, which links industries through the
production of a final good. I use the model to explain the puzzling observa-
tions in a unified framework. The model also provides testable implications,
that allow me to identify the conditions which sign the aggregate relationship
between the number and quality of patents.
The output of intermediate industries is related through production, as the
production of final goods require goods from different industries. As a result,
innovation is related. In particular, innovation in one industry alters the re-
turns to inventing in another industry. To better understand how this mecha-
nism explains the relationship between industries in the patent data, suppose
11
there are two industries with complementary output and fixed set of ideas that
can be implemented (and thus patented). If one industry suddenly has higher
quality ideas, more of them will be implemented and intermediate output in-
creases for that industry, which results in more of the final good. Because of the
complementarities, demand for the other intermediate good increases and this
raises the returns for inventing in the industry where ideas are fixed. Ideas
that were previously unprofitable due to their poor quality are implemented,
implying there is a decline in average patent quality in the second industry.
I develop a model with two intermediate goods to capture the inter-industry
relationship and use it to explain the puzzling observations. Innovation con-
sists of implementing ideas, which implies that innovation and good produc-
tion are a joint process. Joint production has been considered theoretically
([Shleifer, 1986]) and there is emerging empirical evidence for its prevalence
([Holmes and Kim, 2013]). Ideas vary in the quality of the intermediate good
they can be used to produce. The intermediate goods are combined to produce
a final good, which is in turn used for implementation. Use of the final good
for innovation appears in lab-equipment models of economic growth and elimi-
nates the role of knowledge spillovers ([Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991]).
I use the model to explore how innovation “supply” shocks in one indus-
try affect innovation in the rest of the economy. The nature of these shocks is
represented by changes in the quality-distribution of implementable ideas. If
these supply shocks hit different industries throughout time, they can explain
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the stylized facts. In the model, a shock produces a positive relationship be-
tween the number and average quality of implemented ideas in the originating
industry. I explain the (lack of) correlation between number and quality at the
industry level, by the internal shocks (producing a positive relationship) and
external shocks (producing a negative relationship) averaging out over time.
Finally, the aggregate relationship between the number and average quality of
patents is negative, because it captures both the muted-within industry rela-
tionships along with the negative relationships between industries.
Complementarities between industries do not merely imply industries co-
move together in terms of patent activities, they imply that the amount of co-
movement between industries depends on the degree that any two industries
are linked. As a result, co-movement between number and quality should be
strongest when the industries are most complementary. Using input-output
data, I construct a measure of complementarities between each industry pair.
The idea of this measure is that industries are complementary if their out-
puts are used together in similar proportions. I find that as industry pairs
become more complementary, the inter-industry patent relationship becomes
more negative which supports the notion that complementarities explain the
relationships between industries.
Besides providing a way to understand the relationships in the patent data,
the model also offers a testable prediction. Without a model, it is unclear how
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supply shocks produce a negative aggregate relationship between the num-
ber and average quality of patents. In particular, it is not always the case
that the appearance of better ideas leads to a decline in the average quality
of implemented ideas. The model provides the conditions that determine the
correlation of the aggregate relationship between number and average quality
of implemented ideas. I then use the model to show how innovation supply
must have changed across industries for the aggregate relationship between
the number and average quality of patents to be negative.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I review related liter-
ature. Section 2.3 documents the new empirical facts. In section 2.4, I de-
velop the model and characterize the aggregate relationship between the num-
ber and quality of patents. In section 2.5, I provide evidence for asymmetric
changes to innovation supply. These changes are consistent with those re-
quired to explain the empirical aggregate relationship between number and
quality. In Section 2.6, I conclude and argue that these results question the
conventional explanation of the patent surge.
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2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 Why Do Annual Patent Counts Change Overtime?
Several studies have directly linked patents to innovation.3 However, patent
counts may change for reasons unrelated to innovation. Schmookler [1954]
argues that the ratio of patent applications to inventive activity depends on
research complexity, scientific management, collaboration and a firm’s ability
to use inventions – all of which might change over time. Because of these
concerns, Schmookler argues that it is more reliable to analyze fluctuations in
patents instead of trends, as I do.
During periods where changes to the patent system are seen to be minor,
patent counts are likely to be related to the level of inventive activity. Dur-
ing the 1970s research productivity appeared to be declining throughout the
Western world. One explanation for the slowdown is exhaustion of inventive
and technological opportunities [Griliches, 1990]. However, Schankerman and
Pakes [1986] argue that research productivity actually increased during this
time period. They construct estimates of European patent value using renewal
information, and find that research productivity rose if you use value adjusted
patents. Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004] reached a similar conclusion for
U.S. patents by constructing an index of patent quality.
Hall and Ziedonis [2001] argued that a U.S. “patent paradox” began in the
3See Igami [2013] for an example and summary.
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mid-1980s. They note that patents surged while R&D grew modestly and the
importance of patents declined in the eyes of R&D managers. They attribute
the rise to changes in patent management. In contrast, Kortum and Lerner
[1999] explain the rise by changes in R&D management. Both explanations
are supported by patent activity rising across virtually all industries. I argue
that patent counts can grow in multiple industries because certain industries
are becoming more innovative and other industries respond through additional
patenting.
2.2.2 Studies of Patent Quality
The value of a patent is rarely observed. Several surveys exist however, and
they suggest that patents are skew-distributed in their value. Scherer and
Harhoff [2000] find that the top-deciles of eight different samples account for
48%-93% of the total respective sample value. In order to account for this
heterogeneity systematically, one typically relies on more indirect measures of
patent value. Similar to the much of the literature, I rely on forward citations
– the number of future citations a patent receives. As far back as Trajtenberg
[1990], citations have been used to indicate the importance of a patent. There
is a well-established relationship between the number of citations a patent
receives and its economic significance. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2005a],
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Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, and Vopel [1999] and Bessen [2008] all show that ci-
tations are positively related to estimates or survey’s of patent value. Further-
more, the citation-value relationship is supported by studies linking citations
to variables which are thought to be correlated with patent value. These in-
clude whether the patent is litigated, the number of countries in which the
patent is granted, and whether the patent is renewed.4
I find that there is negative relationship between the number and quality
of patents over time. There is mixed evidence about the long-run correlation
between the number and quality of patents in the literature. The estimates of
patent value in Schankerman and Pakes [1986] and an index of patent quality
in Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004] suggest the relationship is negative. Hall
and Ziedonis [2001] compared the number and quality of patents in the semi-
conductor industry,5 using citations. While they find no correlation between
number and citations, they do not take this as evidence that quality of inven-
tions associated with patents remained constant. They argue that applicants
are including extra citations in order to withstand greater legal scrutiny.
One of the difficulties with understanding how patent quality changes over
4See Bessen [2008] for a list of references.
5They focused on this industry due to it being one of the industries with the largest growth
in patents.
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time is that citations are difficult to compare over time. There have been sev-
eral attempts to make citations comparable, but different methodologies pro-
duce different results about the trend in citations. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajten-
berg [2001] and Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe [2010] for example find opposite
trends in average patent quality, because they differ in their approach to ad-
just citations. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001] assumes a stationary age-
distribution of citations, while Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe [2010] allows it
to vary over time. This second approach assumes that patent grant lags are
exogenous - a controversial assumption by their own admission. Schmookler’s
concern about analyzing trends with patents is perhaps even more of a concern
when citations are involved. Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004] argue that the
84% increase in patent citations from 1985 to 1993 can be explained by fac-
tors other than quality improvement, such as computerization which lowers
the cost of citation. To avoid these issues, I compare annual differences in cita-
tions.
Although citations are the standard way to control for patent quality, one
might seek an alternative measure. I do not use any alternative measures, be-
cause there are limitations to each. One alternative is to estimate patent value
from renewal decisions,6 but there are several issues regarding its use for U.S.
data. First, any time series would be very short. Renewals are only available
6Work such as Serrano [2010] uses patents transfers, but they are not publicly available.
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for patents applied after 1983 and one must wait 14 years after a grant to ob-
serve their last renewal decision. Work by Bessen [2008] suggests that patent
value grew after the mid-1980s, but it is unclear what implications this has on
invention quality due to potential changes in the intellectual property regime.
Furthermore, because nearly two-fifths of patents are fully renewed there is
value truncation for the most valuable patents. One might use the number
of countries for which the same invention is patented (patent family size) as
a proxy for patent quality, but there are also concerns with truncation at the
top of the value distribution, and Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004] contend
that patent family size is much less important than citations. Beyond these
two measures, backward citations, the number of claims, technical classes, the
number of inventors are potential proxies for patent quality. However, these
indictors are controversial [Nagaoka, Motohashi, and Goto, 2010].7 Because
many of these additional statistics are fairly controversial, I rely on the stan-
dard measure of quality: future citations from other patents.
2.2.3 Inter-Industry Relationships
I document significant co-movement between industries in patent statistics.
Ouyang [2011] documents that most of aggregate R&D pro-cyclicality can be
7Furthermore, they also produce mixed results when combined into composite indicators.
Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004] found that patent quality increased since the mid-1980s,
when using the number of claims, forward and backward citations, the family size, and technol-
ogy area. The OCED (2008) uses a different composite indicator by incorporating the number
of technical classes and inventors in their composite indicator. This index suggest that patent
quality declined from 1990-2000 to 2000-2010.
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accounted for by co-movement between industries. Co-movement is an im-
portant feature of the economy,8 is explained by two potential forces: a sin-
gle aggregate shock affecting all industries equally [Lucas, 1977], or by an
industry-specific shock that propagates throughout the economy [Long and
Plosser, 1983]. Specifically regarding innovation, there are some theories con-
sistent with an aggregate explanation. Both Shleifer’s (1986) theory of im-
plementation cycles, and the more recent work by Francois and Lloyd-Ellis
[2009] rely on aggregate demand externalities due to coordination. I rule out
aggregate explanations, because they are inconsistent with the puzzling ob-
servations that are documented here. In particular, an aggregate explanation
implies a similar relationship between the number and quality of patents at all
levels of aggregation, which I do not find.
Similar to this paper, Chang [2013] finds that input-output relationships
play an important role in the decision to innovate. He explains R&D co-movement
as strategic interactions amongst supplying and purchasing industries.9 I ar-
gue that independent actions produce a demand shock in another industry,
which gives the appearance that innovation is coordination. Scherer [1982] re-
veals three-fourths of all U.S. industrial R&D is concerned with creating new or
8The NBER’s definition of a recession:
is a [persistent] period of decline in total output, income, employment, and trade,
usually lasting from six months to a year, and marked by widespread contractions
in many industries of the economy.
9R&D levels depend on the (annual) lagged values of another industry’s R&D and whether
the industry is a supplier of demander industry.
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improved externally-sold products.10 The model and explanation here broadly
matches this feature, because most the intermediate good is sold to a final good
industry.
Knowledge Spillovers
I explain the new empirical facts by considering the role of demand exter-
nalities. However, other forces could produce the mechanism which explains
the cross-industry relationship. One such mechanism is knowledge spillovers,
which is well-established in other contexts [Griliches, 1998]. Both innovation
and patenting allow for the transfer of knowledge, and some of this knowledge
may spill into another industry without any market transaction taking place.
In turn, this spillover could generate relationships across industries.
Qualitatively, knowledge spillovers are consistent with the stylized facts
which I document. Consider two industries with independent demand for their
products. Suppose the first industry develops a new invention, which results in
more patents. If this lowers research costs, it leads to more patents in the sec-
ond industry. If the second industry cites the first industry, it raises citations in
the first industry and lowers the citation average in the second industry.11 As
a result, there is a negative correlation between the number of patents in one
10He documents this by classifying patents according to their industry of origin and industry
of use, and then creating a “technology flow” matrix which was used to assign the impact of
R&D for a variety of industries.
11Citations are frequently used to track knowledge spillovers [Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Hen-
derson, 1993].
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industry and quality in the other industry. As a result, the same theoretical
inter-industry relationship could exist from knowledge spillovers.
There is evidence that knowledge spills across industries. Theoretically,
knowledge transfer could occur in two ways. The Marshall-Arrow-Romer view
contends that knowledge spillovers are more likely to occur between firms that
share common knowledge. However, the Jacobs view contends that knowledge
spillovers are strongest when combined with a distinct knowledge base. Bloom,
Schankerman, and Van Reenen [2012] explores the possibility that knowl-
edge spillovers occur across technology classes and evidence of spillovers across
technologies. The empirical evidence on industries suggests that knowledge
spillovers of the Jacobs type are the strongest. The studies using R&D as a
proxy for innovation typically find that inter-industry knowledge spillovers are
stronger than intra-industry knowledge spillovers.12 Using patent citations as
a proxy for knowledge spillovers, Fung and Chow [2002] look at global firms
and find that on average 19.3% of the knowledge spillover is generated within
the industries, with the rest stemming from other industries. However, Ngai
and Samaniego [2011] argues their role may be small as the vast number of
citations occur within industries.
However, knowledge spillovers will struggle to explain the timing of the em-
pirical facts which I document. One key feature of knowledge spillovers is that
12Autant-Bernard and LeSage [2011] find that Jacobs externalities are stronger than
Marshall-Arrow-Romer in France. Bernstein [1988] find that inter-industry knowledge
spillovers result in larger cost reductions than intra-industry knowledge spillovers in Canada.
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they are highly localized at the time of patenting [Li, 2013]. Because knowl-
edge takes time to diffuse at the national level, the impact from a particularly
innovative industry may take several years to be realized. As a result, it is dif-
ficult to explain the contemporaneous relationship. Nevertheless, knowledge
spillovers are an explanation which is complementary to the one told here.
2.3 New Facts
Conventional wisdom largely suggests that there is a negative relationship be-
tween number and quality. In this section, I document the relationship be-
tween the number and quality of patents at different levels of aggregation. I
use a standard measure of patent quality – citations from other patents – to
compare the two. However, comparing citations over time is difficult for three
reasons. There is citation truncation, along with changes to both the propen-
sity to cite and future patent rates. Because there is no clear way to overcome
all three factors, I analyze high-frequency data.
I find a puzzling set of new empirical observations. The average number of
citations appears to be very elastic at the aggregate level. The average num-
ber of citations a patent receives declines by a third of the increase in patent
number. This might suggest that changing patent standards are responsible
for changing patent counts. However, I match patents to industries and exam-
ine the relationship within industries. As I compare the number and quality
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at 1, 2 and 3-digit Standard Industry Classifications, the relationship between
number and quality disappears as finer and finer classifications are used.
I reconcile the differences in the aggregate and industry-level relationships,
by considering interactions between industries. I decompose the aggregate
covariance between number and average citations into two components: a
“within”-industry component reflecting how the number of patents and aver-
age quality co-vary within each industry, and a “between”-industry component
capturing how number and average quality co-move between industries. I find
that the latter accounts for 91% of the covariance. The aggregate relationship
is negative, because the number of patents in one industry is negatively corre-
lated with patent quality in another industry. That is, average patent quality
declines when there is an increase in the number of patents in another indus-
try.
In Section 2.4, I formally argue that production complementarities between
industries account for the differences between the aggregate and industry level
relationships. In this section, I provide empirical support for their role. Com-
plementarities between industries not only imply there is co-movement be-
tween industries, they imply that the amount of co-movement between in-
dustries depends on the degree of linkage between any two industries. By
constructing this complementarity measure, I am able to confirm the inter-
industry relationship exists in the patent data. Using input-output data, I
construct a measure of complementarities between industries, which is based
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on the idea that industries are complements in production if their outputs are
used in similar proportions throughout the economy. I provide empirical sup-
port for the explanation by constructing a measure of complementarities be-
tween each industry and relate this measure back to the patent data. Con-
sistent with an explanation involving complementarities, I find that the inter-
industry innovation relationship strengthens with the degree of complemen-
tarity between each industry pair.
I also consider an alternative explanation for the difference between the ag-
gregate and industry-level relationships: compositional changes. I test whether
industries with fewer citations are more volatile on average and this can ac-
count for the aggregate relationship. While I find some evidence that lower-
“quality” industries are more volatile, the negative aggregate relationship still
largely reflects interactions.
2.3.1 Measuring Patent Quality with Citations
Each patent record contains a “References Cited” section. This includes any
information relevant to a patent’s originality or “prior art.” Perhaps, the most
important reference is that of another patent. A citation delimits the scope of
the property rights awarded by the patent [Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001].
It is the legal responsibility of the applicant to disclose any knowledge that
contributed to their invention.13 As a result, the number of citations that a
13The examiner is also responsible to identify and include any omissions.
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patent receives indicates technological significance. Citations are also linked
to the economic significance of a patent.14
There are three reasons that raw citations are not directly incomparable
over time. First, citations are naturally truncated. That is, younger patents
have less opportunity to accumulate citations than older patents. Second, the
propensity to cite has increased dramatically. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg
[2001] documents that the average patent issued in 1999 makes over twice
as many citations as the average patent issued in 1975.15 Finally, the num-
ber of annual grants changes over time. This rise, along with the increasing
citation propensity increases the total number of citations made. As a result,
comparing citations from a “fixed-window” of time cannot be used to overcome
the truncation.
To make citations comparable, they must be adjusted. To address the prob-
lem of truncated citations, one must estimate the shape of the citation-lag dis-
tribution.16 There are two methodologies to estimate the shape of the citation-
lag distribution. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001] estimates the shape of the
14Bessen [2008] summarizes several studies linking citations to a patent’s economic signifi-
cance through variables thought to be correlated with patent value.
15They attributed this to differences in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) or tech-
nological areas, but Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004] suggest 84% of this rise is due to the
use of computers to help pad patent applications with citations.
16Given this distribution, one can estimate the total citations of any patent by dividing the
observed citations by the fraction of the population distribution that lies in the time interval
for which citations are observed.
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citation-lag distribution by assuming this distribution is stationary and inde-
pendent of overall citation intensity. In contrast, Mehta, Rysman, and Sim-
coe [2010] estimates a citation-lag distribution which varies over time. To do
so, requires variation in the time it takes for a patent to be granted. They
assume that these lags are exogenous to the number of citations received.
However, Popp, Juhl, and Johnson [2004] find that these lags are related to
the number of citations received. The estimates provided by Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg [2001] suggest that citations have risen over time. However, the
estimates of Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe [2010] suggest citations have de-
clined.17 These conflicting results highlight the difficulty in comparing cita-
tions. Instead, I compare the data at higher-frequencies where these method-
ologies produce qualitative relationship between number and quality.18 I use a
citation-adjustment factor which is based on the methodology from Hall, Jaffe,
and Trajtenberg [2001], because it is more commonly used than the Mehta,
Rysman, and Simcoe [2010] measure.
2.3.2 Methodology
To examine the short-run relationship between number and average citations,
I detrend the ln of each series with a Hodrick and Prescott [1997] filter. The
filtering procedure decomposes each series into a sum of a cyclical component
17Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe [2010] claim that most of the differences are attributed to data
rather than methodology, but this does not appear to be the case when comparing identical time
periods.
18See Section 2.2.2 for a brief discussion.
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and a stochastic trend that are uncorrelated from each other. By using ln data,
one can interpret a deviation from trend as a percent difference. It is important
to note that using growth rates instead of filtering the data produces quantita-
tively similar results – see Table 2.3.
To apply the filter, one must specify how it trades off the fit and smoothness
of the trend. I set the smoothing parameter to 6.25 as argued to be appropriate
for annual data by Ravn and Uhlig [2002]. Throughout the paper, I denote Nˆt
and Qˆt by
Nˆt = Deviations from trend of ln Patent Number during year t, and
Qˆt = Deviations from trend of ln Average Adjusted Citations during year t.
The goal of the analysis is to provide stylized facts about the relationship
between number and quality over time. To do so, I calculate correlation coeffi-
cients and elasticities between number and quality. The unit of analysis is the
application year. Alternatively, one could use the grant year. The application
year best reflects the expectation of the inventor, while the grant year best re-
flects change in the patent office. Because applications grow more rapidly than
the grant rate, I analyze the data using the application date.
2.3.3 Sample
The primary data source is the 2010 revision of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research patent data. This dataset is publicly available as part of their
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Patent Data Project or PDP.19 The dataset contains the basic information in a
patent record along with several additional statistics to analyze patents, which
are documented in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2001]. The database consists
of all utility patents.20 All patents must be novel and non-obvious.
In the dataset, there are patents with application dates from 1963-2006.
However, I only have reliable citation data from 1975-1995. Citations are only
recorded on patents granted in 1976 or later. Because it takes 2 years on av-
erage for patents to be granted [Mehta, Rysman, and Simcoe, 2010], I drop
patents with application dates before 1975. I analyze the series until 1995.
While the data includes patents granted until 2006, many patents applied for
in 2002 have yet to be entered in the dataset. In order to adjust the citations,
a patent must have some time to accumulate citations. This is important be-
cause not allowing enough time for patents citation trends can take more than
5 years to appear [Sampat, Mowery, and Ziedonis, 2003].
In order to disaggregate the data, I match patents to firms which allows
one to identify their industry. The vast majority of patents are assigned to cor-
porations [Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001]. About 47% of all patents are
assigned to U.S. non-government organizations and 31% are assigned to non-
U.S. non-government organizations. The remaining patents are either unas-
signed (18%) or belong to either individuals or governments (3%). In order to
assign patents, I match patents to U.S. firms in Compustat – this is discussed
19It can be found at http://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject.
20See Section A.5 for a discussion about the different types of patents.
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in Section 2.3.4.21
I remove 5, 778 duplicate patent records that are the result of multiple-
assignments. I drop 4 patents that are indicated to be missing or withdrawn.
I further restrict the data set to firms in industries which account for the vast
majority of R&D. This primarily consists of manufacturing industries in addi-
tion to a couple other industries. Scherer [1982] documents that agriculture,
crude oil and gas production, air transport, communications, and the electric-
gas-sanitary utilities sector argues are responsible for innovation.22 The HP-
filer cannot be applied to series with missing observations. To account for this,
I further drop 21,495 patents or 136 three digit industries, because they fail to
patent in a particular year.23 In the end, I am left with 486,689 patents.
2.3.4 Matching Patents to Industries
The PDP has undertaken extensive effort to provide a match between assignees
and the securities in the North American Compustat dataset of firm financial
information.24 Bessen [2008] describes the matching procedure in great de-
tail. Bessen [2008] finds that the matched firms account for 96% of the R&D
21One can also analyze the data using technologies classes, which does not require any re-
strictions. This analysis produces a set of stylized facts.
22I do not include agriculture, because it is hard to interpret what it means for agriculture
to be complementary.
23Surprisingly, this results in air transportation being omitted.
24In addition the matches identified in the 1999 NBER patent data, the PDP project has
identified a number of additional matches using a name-matching program. This is important,
because prior editions were based on the universe of firms in 1989.
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performed by all U.S. Compustat firms.25
I obtained the firm data from the Wharton Research Data Services (accessed
in July 2010). After matching the data to firms, I classify each patent by the as-
signee’s standard industrial classification code. This classification refers to the
firm’s primary line of business as determined by Compustat. Unfortunately,
the firm data only contains the current business-line, which implies industry
classification can change over time. However, this issue is mitigated in two
ways. First, the SIC was replace by the NAICS in 1997. As a result, the SIC
classification did not change after that date. Second, the matching procedure
allows me to account for mergers and acquisitions. Whenever, there was a
merger or acquisition I am able to use the industry classification that reflects
the assignee’s original business line.
Conceptually, there are two ways to think about patent classifications: ori-
gin or use.26 The match that I use corresponds more with the industry of origin,
because it is based on assignee name. Although it possible to match patents
to their industry of use,27 the later is rarely used because the end use of an
innovation may correspond to several different industries.
25They also account for 77% of all R&D-reporting firms listed in Compustat and 62% of all
patents issued to domestic non-governmental manufacturing organizations between 1985 and
1991.
26See Hall and Trajtenberg [2004] for a discussion.
27See work by Silverman [2004].
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Table 2.1: Industry Summary Statistics
1 digit (n=4) 2 digit (n=22) 3 digit (n=87)
Ni Qi Ni Qi Ni Qi
Average 54077 16.4 14748 13.8 4818.7 13.2
Min 1349 9.4 136 5.7 136 5.6
Max 271322 27.5 88758 30.6 33823 32.5
2.3.5 The Puzzle
The empirical analysis produces a puzzling set of observations: the number of
patents is negatively correlated with average citations when measured at the
aggregate level, but they are surprisingly uncorrelated when measured within
industries. The aggregate relationship is consistent with patent counts reflect-
ing changes in rent-seeking behavior. However, the industry-level relationship
suggests that patent counts do not reflect changes in rent-seeking. In particu-
lar, any aggregate explanation for a rise in patents - say a change in the patent
system - implies a negative correlation at both the aggregate and the industry
level. Because the correlations differ, one must alternative explanations.
The Aggregate Relationship
Figure 2.2 plots the percent deviations in the number and the average ad-
justed citations of patents by application year. The two series are negatively
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Figure 2.2: Deviations from Trend in the Number of Patents and their Average
Adjusted Citations
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correlated over time, with a correlation coefficient of -0.53.28 The aggregate re-
lationship is consistent with patent counts reflecting changes in rent-seeking
behavior. That is, more low-quality patents are obtained as rent-seeking be-
havior increases. Because it is costly to develop high-quality inventions, these
additional patents consist of inventions that are all of low-quality.
The two series suggest that there is moderate volatility in both the number
and quality of patents. The standard deviation of number is 2.65%, which
28This correlation is similar when using the citations adjustments provided by Mehta, Rys-
man, and Simcoe [2010].
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corresponds to annual change of about a thousand patents by U.S. firms and
inventors. The standard deviation of a change in quality is 1.24%. The mean
number of adjusted citations is about 15, which implies that the typical patent
varies by a fifth of citation. Based on the estimates provided by Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg [2005b], this would correspond to 0.6% change the average market
value of a firm that patents.
The Industry-Level Relationships
If aggregate patent counts are in fact changing because of an increase in rent-
seeking behavior, patent counts within industries should reflect this as well.
There is no reason, however, to suspect that all industries exhibit similar rent-
seeking behavior. Hall [2007] provides two examples industry-specific changes
in patenting practices. First, she argues that there has been a dilution of the
application of the non-obviousness standard in biotechnology due to court deci-
sions. She notes that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) now requires
that new gene sequences to file a specific application or use to be granted. In
the area of business methods, she notes that finding prior art on business
method patent applications is problematic due to the absence of adequately
written prior art documents. In response, the PTO now requires a second ex-
amination for these applications. Both examples highlight how there have been
changes in the capacity of each industry to seek rents.
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Table 2.2: Correlation between Quality and Number by Aggregation Level -
Deviations from Trend
Aggregation Level Agg. 1-digit 2-digit 3-digit
Industries (n) 1 4 22 87
Min -0.58 -0.70 -0.79
Max 0.26 0.55 0.73∑n
i=1wicorr(Nˆi, Qˆi) -0.53 -0.35 -0.20 -0.11
Correlations
For each industry, I detrend the logged series of patent number and average
citations. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 summarizes these correlation coefficients for each
level of disaggregation. I construct the weighted average for each industry
based on their share of patenting over the entire sample. Denote by wi, the
fraction of patents filed over the period for industry i:
wi =
Total Patents in Industry i from 1975 to 1995
Total Patents from 1975 to 1995
.
Clearly, the weighted correlations coefficients are substantially smaller than
the aggregate correlation. As a result, changes within any combination of in-
dustries, cannot account for the aggregate relationship. Furthermore, they de-
cline as industry classifications become finer which suggests that incorporating
interactions between industries might be responsible.
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Table 2.3: Correlation between Quality and Number by Aggregation Level -
Growth Rates
Aggregation Level Agg. 1-digit 2-digit 3-digit
Industries (n) 1 4 22 87
Min -0.61 -0.67 -0.81
Max 0.03 0.62 0.83∑n
i=1wicorr(Nˆi, Qˆi) -0.38 -0.26 -0.17 -0.10
Table 2.4: Regression Results: Elasticity between Number and Quality
Agg 1-Digit 2-Digit 3-Digit
Coefficient -0.337 -0.213 -0.018 -0.027
Standard Error 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.017
P-Value 0.011 0.01 0.008 0.105
95% Confidence Interval [-0.59,-0.08] [-0.37,-0.06] [-0.09,0.05] [-0.06,0.01]
R2 0.2800 0.0816 0.0006 0.0014
N 21 84 462 1827
Elasticities
The puzzle is also reflected in elasticities. I calculate the cyclical elasticity of
patent number and patent quality by estimating the following statistical model
Qˆi,t = βNˆi,t + i,t. (2.1)
at different levels of disaggregation. I omit the intercept, because each se-
ries has already been detrended and thus centered around zero. Once again, I
weight the regression by each industry’s long-run share of patents.
I report the elasticities in Table 2.4. At the aggregate level, the quality
elasticity of patent number is statistically significant. A 1% increase in number
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corresponds to a 0.38% drop in average quality. Once again, the relationship
between number and quality disappears as finer classification of data are used.
At the 3-digit level, a 1% increase in number corresponds to a change in quality
which is indistinguishable from zero.
2.3.6 Decomposition
The aggregate relationship results from interactions between industries. Fol-
lowing Shea [2002] and Ouyang [2011], I approximate the change in the aggre-
gate number of patents and average citations as the weighted averages of the
N disaggregated industries. That is, I approximate number and quality as
Nˆt ∼=
I∑
i=1
wiNˆi, Qˆt ∼=
I∑
i=1
wiQˆi.
Let W be an 1×N vector whose elements are wi. Let ΩNN ,ΩQQ and ΩNQ be
the N ×N variance-covariance matrices of number, quality, and between num-
ber and average citations. Then, the variance-covariance matrix of aggregate
number and aggregate quality is approximately(
V ar(Nˆ) Cov(Nˆ , Qˆ)
Cov(Nˆ , Qˆ) V ar(Wˆ )
)
∼=
(
WΩNNW ′ WΩNQW ′
WΩNQW ′ WΩQQW ′
)
. (2.2)
Each term in (2.2) can be further decomposed into a “within-industry” term
from their diagonal elements, as the average variance (or covariance) of each
industry’s own activities, and a “between-industry” term from the off-diagonal
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elements, as the average co-movement between each industry’s activities with
other industry’s activities.
Decomposing Cov(Nˆ , Qˆ) at the three-digit level reveals that the “between-
” industry components account for 91% the aggregate covariance between the
patent number and quality. This suggests there are strong interactions be-
tween industries. This type of interaction picks up the fact that the average
correlation between the number of patents in one industry and the quality of
patents in another industry is negative.
This degree of interaction between industries lines up well with Ouyang
[2011], who looks at a related statistic. She argues that 94% of R&D pro-
cyclicality can be attributed to co-movement. One potential concern with this
type of analysis is that the between-industry component will appear to be
greater as the data becomes more disaggregated. This concern appears to be
minimal, because even at the one-digit level it is 45% implying that there are
interactions at a very coarse classification.
2.3.7 Complementarities
Next, I present evidence that patent quality is negatively correlated with the
number of patents in complementary industries. Based on Conley and Du-
por [2003], I compute a measure of production complementarities between in-
dustries. The idea behind this metric is that any two industries complement
each other if their outputs are used in similar proportions by other industries.
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Using input-output data, I construct this measure and link it to the patent
data. I indeed find that as industry pairs become more complementary, the
inter-industry patent relationship becomes more negative. This is strong evi-
dence that complementarities explain the number-quality patent relationship
between industries.
The Use Table
To capture how output flows between industries, I rely on one of the input-
output tables in the U.S. economy. The table was published by Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). The table includes the consumption of various com-
modities by industries, final users as well as other non-producing industries.
Because most commodities correspond to a specific industry, the use table cap-
tures the inter-industry flow of commodities. The table is published every
five years. I use the 1987 version, which corresponds to the application year
(1986).29 The table is presented at the 95- and 480-industry detail, which corre-
sponds to roughly the two- and six-digit 1987 SIC. One difficulty with the use
table is that it includes suppliers and purchasers that do not correspond to any
SIC capital-good industry. Suppliers include services and non-industries, such
as wages and business taxes. Besides intermediate industries, purchasers also
include their contribution to type of final use, ie. other components of GDP.
29This table is described in detail by Lawson and Teske [1994].
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Conley and Dupor [2003] focus on manufacturing industries, along with indus-
tries with significant R&D. I remove all final-use columns and drop all addi-
tional rows of the table except for employee compensation.Conley and Dupor
[2003] limit the number of industries used out of concern that patterns may be
obscured by the sheer amount of data.
A Measure of Industry-Complementarities
The basic idea behind the complementary measure is that any two industries
are complementary if their output are used in same proportions. The distance
measure is calculated using the commodity flow from suppliers (the use table
rows) to purchasers (the use-table columns).
To calculate the distance measure, it will be helpful to denote the input-
output table by Φ. The typical element Φ(i, j) is the dollar value of compensa-
tion to industry i for goods used in industry j. With the modifications in Section
2.3.7 in place, Φ is a 27× 26 nonnegative matrix. The columns of Φ, correspond
to the 25 two-digit SIC industries and one additional industry that sums all
the industries that are low in R&D intensity. The rows of Φ correspond to the
compensation of the 26 industries above as well as to labor.
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Conley and Dupor [2003] calculate the sell distance. I redefine their mea-
sure into a measure of complementarities. Specifically, I use a complementari-
ties measure which is 1 less the sell distance.30 That is,
Comp(i, j) = 1− {
N∑
k=1
[Ψ(k, i)−Ψ(k, j)]2} 12 , (2.3)
where
Ψ(i, j) =
Φt(i, j)∑N
k=1 Φ(k, j)
.
The second term in (2.3) is the sell distance, and represents how different
the output usage is between any two industries. Because this measure is de-
scribed in great detail in Conley and Dupor [2003], I omit a detailed analysis
of it. Expression 2.3 is a measure of relative complementarities. That is, one
cannot interpret a 0 measure of complementarities as a perfect substitutes.
Results
I now compare how the relationship between number and quality over time
(corr(Ni, Qj)) varies with the complementarity measure (Comp(i,j)) developed
above. There are several industries used to calculate the complementarity
measure, which are not used in the sample. For this reason, I restrict the
analysis to the industries listed in Table A.1. As Table A.1 shows the number
of patents varies drastically between industries, so each observation will be
weighted by wiwj where wi is defined above.
30There is no reason for the sell distance to be less than 1, but largest sell-distance is close
to 1.
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Figure 2.3: 2-Digit Cross-Industry Correlations between Number of Patents
and Average Citations
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Table 2.5: Innovation and Complementarities
Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
Intercept 0.053 0.031 1.65 0.100
Comp(i,j) -0.302 0.066 -4.55 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is corr(Nˆi, Qˆj). Each observation is weighted by
wi · wj . N = 462, R2 = 0.431.
I test the following specification,
corr(Nˆi, Qˆj) = α + βComp(i, j) + i,j. (2.4)
The regression results are report in Table 2.5 and are plotted in Figure 2.3.
There are two implications from this analysis. The results indicate that as in-
dustry pairs become more complementary, the inter-industry patent relation-
ship becomes increasingly negative. This relationship supports the notion that
complementarities explain the relationships between industries. In Section
2.4, I argue that innovation “supply” shocks in one industry affect innovation
in the complementary industries. If these shocks change the distribution of
implementable ideas, they result in more inventions in both industries, but the
quality of the inventions decline in the complementary industry.
The second implication is that the relationships across industries are strongest
in several industries of the economy. This reaffirms that an aggregate event
cannot explain the relationships in the patent data. If that were the case, num-
ber and quality would be related regardless of the degree of complementarity
between any two industries.
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2.3.8 Alternative Empirical Explanation - Industry Com-
position
There is substantial variation in the number of citations that a typical indus-
try receives. As Table 2.1 shows, the citation averages vary by as much as a
factor of three. Because of this variation, I consider the role that compositional
changes might play in explaining the stylized facts. Above, I document that
number and citations are unrelated within industries. If interactions between
industries were negligible, any change in average citations at aggregate level
has to come from the composition of industries. If the cyclical increase in lowly-
cited industries is larger, then the average number of citations that patents
receive in aggregate will decline. As a result, this empirical explanation could
account for the above observations.
In order to test this possibility, I compare the aggregate number of patents
with their average citations when there are no compositional changes. If the
aggregate correlation disappears when compositional changes are controlled
for, then compositional changes are a possible explanation for the stylized facts.
To control for composition, I fix the weights (patent share) of each indus-
try. Thus, I create an average quality series where the industry composition is
constant:
Q˜ =
n∑
i=1
wiQi
and recompute the aggregate statistics with Q˜ instead of Q.
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At each disaggregation level, Corr (Nˆ , ˆ˜Q) is similar to the original aggre-
gate correlation coefficient. Using weights constructed at the 3-digit level,
Corr (Nˆ , ˆ˜Q) = −0.29. Repeating the elasticity regressions, implies the quality
elasticity of patent number is −.193. These results suggest that compositional
changes can only account for about two-fifths of the aggregate relationship. In
other words, compositional changes cannot solely explain the stylized facts.
In Section 2.5, I provide evidence that low-quality industries play a role in
explaining the stylized facts. This explanation is consistent with the fact that
compositional changes play some role in generating the stylized facts.
2.4 The Model
I develop a model that captures how innovation is related between industries.
The model features two intermediate industries with homogeneous output. In-
novation is broad in the sense that it consists of implementing ideas to produce
an intermediate good. Each industry has an exogenous distribution of ideas
that are varying in the quality of the intermediate good they produce. There
are fixed costs to implementing an idea. As a result, only some of the ideas in
each industry are implemented.
I use the model to explain the stylized facts by analyzing the impact of in-
novation supply shocks to one industry. In the model, a supply shock is repre-
sented by a shift in the distribution of implementable ideas. A positive supply
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shock results in more ideas being implemented in each industry. In the origi-
nating industry, the average quality of implemented ideas increases. However,
in the responding industry, there is a decline in average quality. This implies
that there are both positive and negative relationships between the number
and quality of implemented ideas at the industry-level.
The relationship between number and quality within an industry become
muted, because the internal shocks (producing a positive relationship) and ex-
ternal shocks (producing a negative relationship) average out over time. The
aggregate relationship between the number and average quality of patents cap-
tures both the muted-within industry relationships and the relationships be-
tween industries. Because there are both positive and negative relationships
between-industries, the aggregate relationship is only negative when the inter-
industry relationship are negative.
Without a model, one is unable to determine when the negative relation-
ship between industries dominates the positive relationship. Intuitively, one
expects that a positive supply shock would produce a positive-relationship be-
tween number and quality. However, I show that a negative aggregate relation-
ship is indeed possible. A negative relationship occurs if the shock hits lower-
“quality” industries. Conversely, if the shock occurs to the higher-“quality” the
shock is positive. In Section 2.5, I find evidence for these types of shocks to
explain the aggregate data.
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2.4.1 Setup
The model is static. A representative consumer has linear preferences over the
final good. The consumer is endowed with both the ideas that can be imple-
mented in each industry and firms producing the final good. The economy’s
production structure is represented in Figure 2.4. The final good is produced
by combining two intermediate goods. The final good has two uses. First, it is
consumed. Second, it is required to implement an idea. The model is static, so
the production occurs simultaneously.
The output of each industry is homogeneous.31 Each industry is endowed
with a set of ideas that vary in the quality of the intermediate good that they
eventually produce. In this sense, an invention is synonymous with developing
a different production method.
Production
The final good is produced by combining intermediate goods X1 and X2. Specif-
ically,
Y = (0.5X
(1− 1

)
1 + 0.5X
(1− 1

)
2 )

−1 . (2.5)
In this specification  ∈ (0,+∞) represents the elasticity of substitution be-
tween industries. The degree of substitutability between the output of each
industry increases in . The special cases of  = 0 or +∞ are left for Appendix
31Omitting product innovation allows for a clearer demonstration about how the relative
incentives to invest change between industries.
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Figure 2.4: Production Structure
I
X1
Y C
X2
A.3. For expositional purposes, the effectiveness of each input is symmetric
with respect to each input.32
In order to produce the intermediate good, ideas must be implemented.
There is a pool of prospective inventors into each industry. Each inventor has
an idea of known quality, but they must use a unit of the final good to im-
plement it. Implementation produces a single unit of the intermediate good.
Ideas vary in the quality of the intermediate good that they produce. That is,
an idea of quality qi produces qi · 1 units of the intermediate good i. Then Xi is
the combined output of the implemented ideas in each industry.
32The key result of this section (Proposition 4) is that the average quality of all implemented
ideas is minimized when industries are identical in their innovation supply. When the share
parameters differ, it is no longer the case that industries must be identical in their innovation
supply. Nevertheless, average quality is still characterized by a U-shape.
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Ideas
The quality of ideas in each industry is distributed by a Pareto distribution
with shape parameter k > 2 over support [ai,+∞).33 Denote this distribution
by G(ai). Under this distribution, the output of implementable ideas is skewed.
The average quality of the underlying idea distribution is
kai
k − 1 .
A change in ai can be thought of as supply shock, because it shifts the distri-
bution of ideas in each industry. The supply shock is positive when ai increases,
because the quality of every implementable idea in industry i improves.
2.4.2 Equilibrium
The returns to implementing each idea decline in quality. As a result, there is
a cutoff idea φ∗i where developing any lower-quality idea in industry i produces
negative returns. The equilibrium is entirely described by the cutoffs φ∗1 and φ∗2.
To highlight how the incentives to implement are related between industries, I
focus on a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a vector (φ∗1, φ∗2, N1, N2, X1, X2, R1, R2, Y )
of idea cutoffs, measures of implemented ideas, measures of total intermediate
outputs, intermediate good prices, and the total amount of final good produced
such that the following conditions hold:
33k > 2 ensures the first two moments exist.
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• Given prices R1 and R2, the final good producer solves
max
X1,X2
Y (X1, X2)−R1X1 −R2X2
• Given price Ri and idea of quality q, inventors implement the idea if
Riq ≥ 1
• The resource constraint is satisfied: Y (X1, X2) = C +N1 +N2.
• Aggregate Consistency
Ni =
∫ ∞
φ∗i
gi(q)dq, Xi =
∫ ∞
φ∗i
qgi(q)dq
Given the distributional assumptions, in such an equilibrium, the number
of implemented ideas in each industry is
Ni = (
ai
φ∗i
)k, (2.6)
while the total output in each industry is
Xi =
kaki
(k − 1)φ∗i k−1
. (2.7)
Dividing (2.7) by (2.6) gives the average quality for industry i :
Qi =
kφ∗i
k − 1 . (2.8)
That is, the average quality of implemented ideas is proportional to the marginal
idea that is implemented. The price of the intermediate good is inversely re-
lated to the quality of the marginal idea in that industry.
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In Appendix A.1, I show that the cutoffs are given by
φ∗i = 2

−1
(
(
aj
ai
)
k(−1)
+k−1 + 1
) 1
1− . (2.9)
It is important to note that the solution to the competitive equilibrium is
also the solution to the planners problem. This would not be the case if there
were knowledge spillovers.
Aggregation
Denote by N the total number of ideas that are implemented:
N = N1 +N2.
Furthermore, I define the average quality of implemented ideas as
Q :=
N1Q1 +N2Q2
N1 +N2
. (2.10)
This definition assumes that inventions in different industries are comparable,
which has to be implicitly assumed when one analyzes changes in the aggre-
gate.
2.4.3 Correlated Shocks
From (2.9), the following proposition is apparent.
Proposition 1. The average quality of implemented ideas is invariant to changes
in innovation supply that are proportional in each industry.
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There are two effects from any shock. Suppose the supply shocks are posi-
tive. First, the increase in supply results in more of the intermediate good. As
a result, the price of the intermediate good declines and the cutoffs should in-
crease. However, because the intermediate goods are cheaper, more of the final
good is produced. As the final good becomes more abundant, implementation
costs decline equally for each industry and this should result in lower cutoffs.
Because these two effects cancel each other out, the cutoffs do not change.
2.4.4 Uncorrelated Shocks
I explore how a supply shock to one industry affects both industries. I begin by
focusing on the “within” effect.
Proposition 2 (∂φ
∗
i
∂ai
> 0). Better ideas in a industry imply that more ideas are
produced, output increases and average quality increases within the industry.
Figure 2.5 shows the impact of a positive supply shock hitting industry 1.
As ideas become more productive in one industry, the output of each idea in-
creases in that industry. The result is that the industry’s output becomes more
abundant, which lowers the price of the good and raises the cutoff. It is less
obvious how the number of implemented ideas changes, because there are two
countervailing effects. First, increasing the cutoff results in fewer ideas be-
ing developed. However, there are now more ideas above the new threshold as
well. Given the distributional assumptions, the net result is an increase in the
number of implemented ideas.
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Figure 2.5: Changes in Cutoffs from an increase in a1
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Now consider the impact of the shock on the other industry, which can be
thought of as the “cross” effect.
Proposition 3 (∂φ
∗
i
∂aj
< 0). Better ideas one industry imply that more ideas are
produced, output increases and average quality declines in the other industry.
As more of the final good is produced, the demand for the other intermediate
good increases. Inventors respond by implementing more ideas, which can only
be of lower quality.
Corollary 1. Any supply shock results in the number of implemented ideas in
one industry being negatively correlated with the average quality of ideas in the
other industry.
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Corollary 2. A positive supply shock increases the aggregate number of imple-
mented ideas.
Proposition 2 and 3 together imply that N rises when a1 increases.
Corollary 3. Any supply shock result in the average quality of each industry
moving in opposite directions.
Proposition 2 and 3 imply that the cross-effect and within-effect are oppo-
site in direction. As a result, the average quality of all implemented ideas
depends on whether the cross-effect is greater than the within effect. In the
next proposition, I show that average quality depends on the relative quality
of ideas between industries.
Innovation Supply and Implemented Idea Quality: A U Relationship
Proposition 4 ( ∂Q
∂ai
< 0, ∂Q
∂aj
> 0 if ai < aj). The average quality of the imple-
mented ideas declines (increases) if ideas get better in the worse (better) industry.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
Figure 2.6 demonstrates how the average quality of implemented ideas
changes when there is an increase in supply. To understand Proposition 4,
consider the following example.
Example 1. Final Good Production is Cobb-Douglas ( = 1) with θ = 0.5
Fact 1. Aggregate quality is a weighted average of the average quality of each
industry.
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Figure 2.6: Number and Quality of the Aggregate Implemented Ideas
a1-a20
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Q
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Proof. The price is inversely related to the quality of the marginal idea in
that industry. Using (2.6) and (2.7), the factor shares are proportional to the
number of implemented ideas:
1
φi
Xi =
k
k − 1N1 (2.11)
With a Cobb-Douglas production, the expenditure share of each good is con-
stant. The implication is that the average quality of all implemented ideas is
determined by the cutoffs, because (2.10) reduces to
Q =
Q1 +Q2
2
.
Recall Corollary 3, which implies that any change in quality is always op-
posite in direction. For proposition 4 to hold, the following must be true.
Fact 2. The cross-effect is smaller than the within-effect on quality when the
shock occurs in the higher-quality industry.
Proof. The expenditure share for each good is 1
2
. Using (2.11), it must be that
1
2
=
1
φ1
X1
Y
=
kN1
(k − 1)N1
√
Q1Q2
=
k
(k − 1)√Q1Q2
. (2.12)
From (2.12) it obvious that any change to the average quality of ideas in one
industry is opposite in direction but proportionally equal in magnitude. From
(2.8) it must be that the cutoffs move in proportionally equal and opposite di-
rections. As a result, the effect of a shock to any industry is always larger in
level for the higher-quality industry.
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To understand why the cross-effect is smaller when the shock occurs to
a high-quality industry, suppose that a1 < a2. That is, industry 1 has rela-
tively lower-quality ideas to implement. Recall, complementarities imply that
N1 = N2. Prior to a shock, it then must be that industry 1 implements rela-
tively lower-quality ideas compared to industry 2 (φ1 < φ2). A positive shock
to industry 2, lowers the cutoff in industry 1 to because it increases the price
of good 1. However, it is very costly to produce more X1 ( 1φ1 >
1
φ2
) because the
cutoff only generates a small increase in output. As a result, the cross-effect is
smaller when the shock occurs in the high-quality industry.
2.5 Evidence of Asymmetric Innovation Supply
Shocks
In Section 2.4, I theoretically show that the relationship between the number
and average quality of aggregate patents depends on the types of industries
receiving an innovation supply (idea) shock. In particular, when a shock hits an
industry which typically has ideas that are of relatively lower (higher)-quality
compared to the other industries, the aggregate relationship will be negative
(positive).
Over the entire sample time period, the number and average quality of ag-
gregate patents is negatively correlated. However, as can be seen in Figure
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2.2, the relationship is actually positive during the first-half of the time pe-
riod. This variation in the aggregate relationship provides three testable pre-
dictions. In particular, to use the model to explain the time-series, requires that
during the first sub-period, the supply of innovation in higher-quality indus-
tries is relatively more “volatile” compared to that of lower-quality industries;
similarly, it must be relatively less “volatile” in both the second sub-period and
the overall time series.
In this section, I identify innovation supply shocks and verify that they
are consistent with these predictions. Using the patent data, I back out these
shocks from changes in the number of highly-cited patents. The idea behind
this approach is that the number of significant inventions indicates the quality
of ideas that can be implemented. To test the predictions, I create two indus-
tries by aggregating the three digit industries according to their innovation
supply. After doing so, I show that supply shocks to low and high-quality in-
dustries are asymmetric and consistent with the ones theoretically required to
explain the data using the model.
2.5.1 Identifying Innovation Supply
The decision to implement an idea depends on the demand for the good. This
endogenity of the decision to patent complicates the use of patents to identify
the underlying distribution of ideas. To overcome this, I assume that the top
of the supply distribution is related to the entire distribution of idea quality.
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With this assumption, I can identify the supply of innovation by examining the
most valuable patents. In particular, very valuable patents are always more
valuable than the cost of patenting. As a result, the higher-quality ideas are
patented immediately to ensure their monopoly rights are obtained.34 Under
this assumption, changes in the number of top patents identifies the distribu-
tion of ideas.
2.5.2 Ranking Industries by Quality
To test the model, I must compare the supply shocks low-quality industries
to the ones in high-quality industries. This involves ranking and grouping
industries together. Prior studies focus on R&D to Sales [Ngai and Samaniego,
2011, Klevorick, Levin, Nelson, and Winter, 1993], but this is controversial
[Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005]. One difficulty with this measure is that
R&D is an input into innovation. As a result, it is influenced by both demand
and supply. Instead I rank industries according to 90th citation percentile.
Due to the difficulty with citations changing over time, I make the comparison
using the value in the median year - 1985.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to use citations to com-
pare industries. This approach is supported in two ways. First, this measure
of industry quality is positively correlated with R&D to sales for the firms that
34While the US has a first-to-invent system, the first applicant to file for the patent still has
the prima facie right to the grant.
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were assigned patents.35 Second, Hall and Trajtenberg [2004] documents that
rapidly growing patent classes are associated with patent classes that receive
more citations. These classes include information, data processing and multi-
cellular biotechnology - all thought to be the most “innovative” technologies.
2.5.3 Supply Shocks
Next, I construct supply shocks for the “low” and “high”-quality industries. I
group the ranked industries into two industries that are roughly equally-sized
in terms of their long-run share of patents. I create two time-series that are the
aggregation of the top ideas at three digit level. That is, I count the number of
patents above the 90-th citation percentile trend in each industry –N90i . I then
create two time series of the top ideas for the two aggregated industries:
Nˆ90L =
∑
Low Quality
N90i and Nˆ90H =
∑
High Quality
N90i .
The supply shocks for the two representative industries are calculated as
deviations in N90L and N90H .
2.5.4 Results
Figure 2.7 plots the supply shocks for the “low” and “high”-quality industries.
The figure does in fact suggest that the nature of the supply shocks between
1975-1984 were different from those in 1985-1995. In fact, Table 2.6 indicates
35The correlation coefficient is 0.46.
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Figure 2.7: Supply Shocks Aggregated by Industry Quality
-15% 
-10% 
-5% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s 
fr
o
m
 T
re
n
d
 
Application Year 
Patents in the Top-Decile of Lower-Quality Industries 
Patents in the Top-Decile of Higher-Quality Industries 
that the negative aggregate relationship between number and quality is more
prevalent during the second time period. I calculate the volatility for each sub-
period and compare it with the aggregate relationship in Table 2.6. Indeed, the
supply of innovation in higher-quality industries is relatively more “volatile”
compared to that of lower-quality industries during the first sub-period, rela-
tively less “volatile” in both the second sub-period and the overall time series.
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Table 2.6: Supply Shocks and the Aggregate Relationship between the Number
and Quality of Patents
corr(Nˆ ,Qˆ) Std(N90L )/Std(Nˆ90H )
1975-1995 -0.53 1.07
1975-1984 0.48 0.56
1985-1995 -0.86 1.96
2.6 Conclusion
I argue that innovation decisions are related between industries with comple-
mentary output. When the output of two industries is complementary, inno-
vation in one industry results in greater demand for the output of the other
industry. As a result, the returns to innovation in the second industry increase
and there is more innovation. If innovative output is heterogeneous in quality,
the average quality of innovations in the second industry declines as lower-
quality ideas are used in innovation. This mechanism explains a previously
unconsidered relationship between industries in the patent data. Specifically,
the number of patents in one industry is negatively correlated with the qual-
ity of patented inventions in another industry. I provide empirical support for
the explanation by constructing a measure of complementarities between each
industry and relate this measure back to the patent data. Consistent with an
explanation involving complementarities, I find that the inter-industry inno-
vation relationship strengthens with the degree of complementarity between
each industry pair.
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These interactions between industries make it difficult to interpret innova-
tion data. A negative relationship between the number and quality of patents
exists at the aggregate level and is widely seen to support the notion that
patent counts largely reflect changes in rent-seeking behavior. However, focus-
ing on the aggregate relationship between the number and quality of patents,
ignores important inter-industry interactions. Specifically, the number and
quality of patents are uncorrelated within industries. It is these inter-industry
interactions from the production structure which drive the difference between
the two relationships.
While I argue that patent statistics largely reflect innovation, patent qual-
ity declines when the number of patents increase. It is still an open question
whether the responding industry is inventing or just seeking rents. Neverthe-
less, patents must in part be related innovation. Furthermore, these interac-
tions make it difficult to attribute the entire surge in patents to changes in the
patent system as an innovation supply shock to a particular industry can pro-
duce a decline in average patent quality due to the responses of complementary
industries.
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Chapter 3
Income Loss and Bankruptcies
over the Business Cycle
3.1 Introduction
The 2008-2009 recession witnessed a sharp and rapid jump in Canadian con-
sumer bankruptcies and proposals (see Figure 3.1). The insolvency rate peaked
at nearly 50% above its pre-recession level.1 While the rise in insolvency dur-
ing a recession is not surprising, there is surprisingly little agreement over
what factors account for these cyclical fluctuations. This reflects an ongoing
debate about the relative importance of “economic shocks” and poor financial
management in accounting for personal bankruptcies.
To assess the underlying drivers of cyclical fluctuations in filings, we exam-
ine both micro and macro data. Our micro level analysis makes use of a unique
data set containing demographic characteristics (age, gender, family size) as
1The consumer insolvency rate is the number of consumer bankruptcies and proposal per
thousand adults.
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Figure 3.1: Monthly Consumer Insolvencies (Bankruptcies and Proposals) in
Canada since 1987
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well as the nature of debts, assets and income of Canadian insolvency filers
from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2011.2 We use this data to examine the con-
tribution of unemployment to the rise in filings during the recession, as well as
to document cyclical changes in the characteristics of insolvency filers. Given
the short period covered by this data, we also examine aggregate data at the
national, and city level to examine the contribution of unemployment rates,
debt levels and interest rates to cyclical fluctuations in personal insolvency fil-
ings since the 1980s.
We use this data to quantify the contribution of two channels that may drive
2The data was provided by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB), and is
from mandatory forms completed by filers.
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cyclical movements in insolvency filings and consumer credit. First, increased
income volatility (reflected in higher unemployment rates) during recessions
could financially strain some households, potentially triggering greater de-
mand for loans and higher insolvencies. The other channel, which we refer to as
changes in “lending standards,” focuses on how borrowers respond to changes
in their access to credit. Of course, it is possible that lending standards tighten
in response to increased default risk from a rise in job losses. This theoretical
relationship is explored in Chapter 4.
Our focus on these channels is motivated by the literature and aggregate
data. As Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, the rise in insolvencies closely tracked
the rise and decline in the unemployment rate.3 This positive correlation be-
tween personal insolvency filings and unemployment rates is consistent with
the patterns observed during the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s (see
OSB, 2007).4 While the correlation between unemployment rates and insol-
vency filings suggests that declining income help account for cyclical move-
ments in filings, their quantitative contribution remains debated.
Credit market changes may also impact borrower incentives to file for bankruptcy.
A tightening of lending standards during recessions may make filing more at-
tractive for heavily indebted borrowers faced with lenders unwilling to rollover
existing debt or higher interest rates. Changes to (internal) cost of funds of
3Figure 3.3 excludes filers who ran a business in the last 5 years and those with liabilities
larger than $1,000,000.
4Similar patterns for the U.S. are documented in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.2: Annual Unemployment and Consumer Insolvency Rate: 1966-2011
Figure 3.3: Quarterly Unemp. and Consumer Insolvency Rate: 05Q1-11Q2
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lenders may lead to similar outcomes, by either increasing the cost of loans or
inducing lenders to restrict access to credit.5 Indeed, credit bureau data sug-
gests that “marginal” borrowers had the greatest loss in credit access (deRitis,
Ackcay, and Kernytsky [2012]).
Our findings suggest both of these channels play an important role in cycli-
cal movements in insolvencies. Our regression analysis at the national level
indicates that cyclical fluctuations in unemployment rates and consumer in-
terest rates play the largest role in accounting for business cycle movements
in insolvency rates. We find similar results using cross-city variation in unem-
ployment and insolvency rates. We also analyze 11 Canadian cities for which
we have house price data from 1999 to 2012. In this case, we find that un-
employment and house price changes play an important role in accounting for
variation in filings across cities.
The filer level data also suggests that unemployment and credit market
conditions are significant factors in accounting for cyclical fluctuations in fil-
ings. As a rough measure of the contribution of unemployment, we compute the
fraction of the increase in insolvency filings (relative to 2007) due to filers who
report either no employment income or employment insurance income when
filing (see Table 3.15). This suggests that 40 to 60 percent of the rise in filings
over 2008 – 2011 may be directly attributable to labour market shocks.6 Our
5Chapter 4 builds a formal analytical structure with the objective if using quantitative eco-
nomic theory to derive empirical predictions.
6It is difficult to say if this is an upper or lower bound. On the one hand, some files could
have experienced job loss prior to filing that contributed to higher debt levels. Conversely, some
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findings suggest that credit market conditions may help account for the rise
in filings. While the recent recession saw a fall in short term borrowing rates,
both the credit bureau (which indicate a tightening of lending standards) and
the fall in house price suggest that some households may have found access
to credit more difficult. This is consistent with the significant contribution of
home owners (which we identify as filers reporting having mortgage debt) to
the rise in filings.
The rise in filings was largely driven by more “middle-class” filers. We docu-
ment this in several ways. First, we observe that the fraction of filers receiving
unemployment benefits rises, which suggests individuals with stronger ties to
the labour market (given the requirements to qualify for unemployment bene-
fits) are contributing to the rise. We also see a growth in the average monthly
income, assets and debts during the recession. In addition, a larger fraction
of filers were middle-aged, owned their home, and cohabited with a partner.7
Both the mix of debt (increased share of housing debt and higher debt levels)
suggest that many filers would have had pre-recession income levels to sup-
port this debt. To the extent that the average assets (and liabilities) of filers is
a good proxy for the cyclical rise in “middle-class” filers, the 2008-09 recession
appears to be broadly consistent with patterns observed in past recessions (see
Figures 3.4 and 3.5).
people with no income could have been pushed into filing due to tighter lending standards, with
the issue of employment income playing a secondary role.
7 We compare the filer population to the general population (using Statistics Canada data),
and find that these changes are not driven by shifts in the characteristics of the Canadian
populace.
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Figure 3.4: Average Bankruptcy Filer Assets in 2002 Dollars: 1976-2009
Figure 3.5: Average Bankruptcy Filer in 2002 Dollars: 1976-2009
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Our findings offer insight into the debate over whether bankruptcies are
driven by adverse shocks or “strategic” debtors. One view, exemplified by the
findings of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook [2000], is that (negative) income
shocks are a key factor in many (up to two-thirds) of U.S. bankruptcies. In con-
trast, Fay, Hurst, and White [2002] conclude that adverse income shocks do not
play a significant role in accounting for filings. Our analysis lends support to
both views. Using the Survey of Financial Security, we use filer demographic
characteristics and balance sheets to impute their income. While we find that
imputed and actual income for non-homeowners are relatively similar, for fil-
ers with mortgage debt our imputed income measure is much larger than the
reported income. As we find that homeowners can account for a large fraction
of the rise in filings during the last recession. We interpret this as suggesting
that economic shocks are a key factor in cyclical movements in filings. How-
ever, our findings are consistent with many filers (particularly during “normal”
economic times) experiencing relatively small income shocks.
Our work is related to several recent studies which also examine filer data
provided by the OSB. Sarra [2011] examines an OSB sample of filers between
2008 and 2010, and concludes that insufficient income and unemployment ac-
counted for nearly half of the bankruptcies and just over half of consumer pro-
posals. Duncan, Fast, and Johnson [2012] compare the characteristics of 4,000
bankruptcy filers in 2007 and 2010. In addition to some of the variables exam-
ined in this paper, they use the “reason for bankruptcy” question, and find that
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the fraction of filers reporting unemployment as the main cause of bankruptcy
rose between 2007 and 2010.
There is a small but growing literature on the role of unemployment, con-
sumer debt levels and house prices in accounting for cyclical fluctuations in
U.S. filings. Bishop [1998] studies the impact of the debt service ratio and
(un)employment on filings over 1960-1996. He finds that while the elasticity of
bankruptcies with respect to the employment rate is roughly 50% larger than
for consumer debt service, the larger variation in the consumer debt service
ratio means it is quantitatively more important in accounting for changes in
bankruptcies.8 Garrett and Wall [2013] use state level unemployment rate to
construct dummy variables which indicate how many quarters a state has been
in recession (expansion). Focusing on the 1998.Q1 to 2004.Q4 period, they find
that bankruptcies exhibit a countercyclical pattern, with filings peaking at the
end of recessions and slowly declining during the initial quarters of recovery.9
A related literature has focused on credit card borrowing and default. Agar-
wal and Liu [2003] use credit card data over 1994-2001 from a large U.S. finan-
cial institution to examine how county-level unemployment rates impact the
probability of credit card delinquency, conditional on the account balance, in-
terest rate and borrower characteristics. They find that higher unemployment
8Unfortunately, comparable Canadian data on the DSR is not available, since the Statis-
tics Canada measure only includes interest payments while the U.S. DSR measure includes
interest and principal payments.
9A related literature examines the factors that account for bankruptcy filings, without dis-
entangling the trend from cyclical fluctuations. VISA USA [1996] found that both employment
growth and house prices (among other factors) significantly impacted bankruptcy filing rates.
Luckett [2002] reviews several related studies on the U.S. bankruptcy filings.
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rates have a statistically significant impact on delinquencies, with an elasticity
of roughly 2. In contrast, Gross and Souleles [2002], who look at bankruptcy
among a large sample of credit card accounts over 1995-1997, find that risk
factors (such as state level unemployment and house prices) play a small role
in the rise in bankruptcies. Given the longer time period and the inclusion of a
major business cycle in our analysis, it is not surprising that, similar to Agar-
wal and Liu [2003], we find that both unemployment rates and house prices
play a quantitatively significant role in cyclical movements in filings.
The supply channel has received less attention in the empirical literature.
Sarra [2011] reports that while few filers report access to credit as the main
cause of their filing, there is suggestive evidence that lending standards were
tightened (and loan approval rates fell) during the 2008 recession. Allen and
Damar [2012] also examine data on Canadian filers over 2007-09, and find that
neighborhoods where bank branches closed due to mergers (possibly resulting
in the loss of “soft information” on borrowers) experienced higher filings than
neighborhoods where branches did not close. They interpret this as suggesting
that local supply effects can impact bankruptcy filings.10 Our paper comple-
ments this work by exploring how credit market tightening can impact house-
hold decision to file for bankruptcy.
10Less directly related to our work is a large literature on how shocks to the financial sec-
tor (particularly banks) impact the real economy. Den Haan and Yamashiro [2009] find that
monetary policy shocks have large impacts on consumer lending in Canada.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 examines the cyclical rela-
tionship between aggregate economic indicators and insolvency rates over the
past thirty years, and outlines some evidence on changes in lending standards.
Section 3.3 examines how the characteristics of filers varied over 2005-2011.
Section 3.4 offers a brief conclusion.
3.2 Aggregate Data on Insolvency Filing Cycles
We begin by documenting cyclical movements in insolvency filings at the na-
tional and city level. National level data is available annually for most series
since the 1970s and quarterly for insolvency since the early nineties. Later, we
analyze city level filings with a focuses on more recent periods (post 1987) due
to data limitations. To distinguish cyclical fluctuations from longer-run trends,
we de-trend our data using the HP-filter.11 This is particularly important since
insolvencies have a clear secular trend while several other series (e.g., unem-
ployment) do not.
Our analysis yields three key findings. First, the rise in filings during the
most recent recession was similar to past recessions. This is important, as it
suggests that insights from our analysis of filer level data are likely to general-
ize to past recessions. Second, changes in unemployment are closely correlated
11For annual (quarterly) data, we set the smoothing parameter (which governs the trade off
between fit and degree of smoothness) to 6.25 (1600) based on Ravn and Uhlig [2002].
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with changes in filings. Third, we find suggestive evidence that lending stan-
dards – possibly operating partly through changes in household net worth –
also play a significant role in cyclical fluctuations.
3.2.1 National Data
Our national analysis documents the correlations between cyclical fluctuations
in insolvency filings, unemployment, interest rates, and consumer debt. Where
appropriate, we define these terms in the text. Section B.2 contains the data
sources used in this paper. The inclusion of unemployment and debt are nat-
ural, as income loss is frequently cited as a cause of insolvency, while the dis-
charge of debt is typically the main benefit from filing. As a proxy for credit
market conditions, we also include interest rates. Finally, as a proxy for shocks
to household balance sheets, where possible we examine the relationship with
house prices.
Annual Data: 1966-2011
Table 3.1 reports the correlations between the cyclical deviations from trend of
insolvency filing rate and key aggregate variables, and Table 3.2 reports the
corresponding correlations for the growth rates. The consumer insolvency rate
is the number of consumer insolvencies per thousand residents aged 18 years
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Table 3.1: National Deviation from Trend Correlations with the Insolvency
Rate
Years 1966-2011 1977-2011 1980-2011
̂Unemployment 0.29 0.50 0.58
̂Unemployment(t− 1) -0.28 -0.34 -0.33
̂ConsumerCredit/DisposableIncome -0.07 -0.09 -0.14
̂ConsumerCredit/DisposableIncome(t− 1) 0.02 -0.10 -0.21
̂MortgageCredit/DisposableIncome(t) -0.19 -0.10 -0.14
̂MortgageCredit/DisposableIncome(t− 1) 0.08 -0.04 -0.12
̂Liability/HomeEquity -0.04 0.18 0.24
̂Liability/HomeEquity(t− 1) 0.19 0.20 0.22
̂BankRate -0.31 -0.37 -0.41
̂BankRate(t− 1) 0.24 0.34 0.35
̂MortgageInterestRate -0.01 0.04 -0.02
̂MortgageInterestRate(t− 1) 0.45 0.62 0.69
̂ConsumerInterestRate -0.05
̂ConsumerInterestRate(t− 1) 0.62
̂CreditCardDelinquencies 0.63 0.63
or above.12 As can be seen from comparing Tables 3.1 and 3.2, detrending using
first differences (i.e., growth rates) yields similar correlations to the HP-filter.
While data availability leads us to focus on the 1980-2011 period, we also report
correlations for series which are available prior to 1981.
The correlation between the unemployment rate and filings is consistent
12Insolvency statistics are only available from 1987 onwards. Prior to the 1992 reforms,
proposals were a negligible component of the aggregate insolvency statistic. For this reason,
we extend the insolvency series by including using bankruptcy data that goes back until 1966.
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Table 3.2: National Growth Rate Correlations with the Insolvency Rate
Years 1966-2011 1977-2011 1980-2011
Unemployment 0.34 0.55 0.57
Unemployment(t-1) -0.28 -0.39 -0.36
Consumer Credit/Disposable Income -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Consumer Credit/Disposable Income (t-1) -0.21 -0.13 -0.08
Mortgage Credit/Disposable Income -0.16 -0.04 -0.02
Mortgage Credit/Disposable Income (t-1) -0.19 -0.12 -0.08
Liability/Home Equity 0.00 0.19 0.19
Liability/Home Equity(t-1) -0.23 -0.14 -0.10
Bank Rate -0.19 -0.31 -0.36
Bank Rate (t-1) 0.27 0.38 0.37
Mortgage Rate 0.05 0.05 -0.01
Mortgage Rate (t-1) 0.21 0.23 0.21
Consumer Interest Rate -0.05
Consumer Interest Rate (t-1) 0.38
Credit Card Delinquencies 0.60 0.61
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with the view that income shocks are an important factor in many bankrupt-
cies (see Tables 3.1 and 3.3, and Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.6). This positive corre-
lation reflects the countercyclical pattern of unemployment and insolvency, as
both rise during recessions and decline during expansions (relative to trend).
As Figures 3.6 and 3.3 illustrates, this positive relationship was especially
pronounced over 2008-2010. The negative correlation between lagged unem-
ployment and insolvency suggests that unemployment rates may decline more
quickly when the recession ends than filings.13 Interestingly, the correlation be-
tween unemployment and filings has increased since the late 1970s. This may
be due to changes during the 1970s aimed at increasing access to bankruptcy
for lower-income consumers (including the unemployed) who would have had
trouble arranging a payment option to access the bankruptcy system (Brighton
and Connadis, 1982).
We also examine consumer and mortgage debt. Our measures of consumer
and mortgage debt come from the national balance sheet (flow of funds). It
is important to note that HELOCs are grouped with other lines of credit as
part of consumer credit in Canada. Given that the main objective of an in-
solvency filing is to discharge debt, one might expect fluctuations in insolven-
cies to track changes in consumer debt levels. However, cyclical movements
in consumer credit and mortgage debt relative to disposable personal income
are either slightly negatively correlated or uncorrelated with insolvencies (see
13The regression of insolvency (unemployment) deviations on one and two period lagged val-
ues of insolvency (unemployment) yields a similar pattern of a positive coefficient on the first
lag and a negative coefficient on the second lag.
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Tables 3.1 and 3.2).14 This reflects the fact that consumer borrowing relative
to income is slightly pro-cyclical, while insolvencies are countercyclical. From
the point of view of simple economic theory, this is counter-intuitive, as one
would expect borrowing to increase as households seek to smooth out short-
run income declines during recessions. That this does not occur suggests that
borrowing becomes either more expensive or less accessible for households dur-
ing recessions, or that household perceive income shocks during recessions to
be persistent rather than transitory. This cyclical pattern of credit access may
also reflect household balance sheet effects, as the ratio of liabilities to home
equity is counter-cyclical (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2).15
Since data on the average (debt-weighted) interest rate of existing and new
consumer debt does not exist, we consider three alternative interest rate mea-
sures. The first is the Bank Rate, which is closely related to the short term
rate at which banks borrow. The second is the average mortgage interest rate,
while the third is the prime lending rate for consumer loans. While the con-
sumer loan rate is arguably the best proxy for non-mortgage consumer borrow-
ing costs, it is only available since 1980.
As can be seen from Tables 3.1 and 3.2, average interest rates and current
borrowing interest generally have a small negative correlation with insolven-
cies. This is consistent with the view that interest rates for prime borrowers
14Changes in debt levels may, however, be important in understanding longer run trends in
insolvencies, since the secular rise in debt parallels the rise in filings in Figure 3.7
15This may be partially driven by cyclical changes in house prices, which can have a large
impact on household balance sheets.
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Figure 3.6: Annual Unemployment and Consumer Insolvency Rate: Deviations
from HP-Trend
Figure 3.7: Consumer Credit/Personal Disposable Income and Insolvency
Rate:1966-2011
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tend to fall during recessions. However, the previous year’s interest rate is neg-
atively correlated with insolvencies over the cycles. This may reflect the impact
of monetary policy, as short term rates tend to rise near the end of expansions.
The interest rate and debt-income correlations together suggest that changes
in access to credit (lending standards) may be important in accounting for cycli-
cal movements in insolvencies. Economic theory suggests that lower interest
rates (for low risk borrowers) combined with the incentive to smooth out tem-
porary income declines should result in higher levels of borrowing. That this
does not occur suggests that either riskier borrowers face higher interest rates
and/or tighter borrowing limits (less access to credit). This mechanism would
be consistent with both reduced borrowing, and higher insolvencies as con-
sumers found it more difficult to either roll-over or finance existing debt.
Finally, credit card delinquencies have a high positive correlation with in-
solvencies. While not surprising, this also suggests that the risk premium for
(relatively higher) risk borrowers should increase during recessions. In turn,
this higher-risk premium could act to make insolvency more likely for some
highly indebted borrowers.
Although this analysis does not examine business related filings, it is worth
noting that business related filings rose significantly during the recession. In
fact, the fraction of business-related filings increased during (and after) the
recent recession.
86
3.2.2 National Level Empirics
We regress the deviation from the H-P trend of the insolvency rate on the ln
deviations (denoted by a “hat” – of) contemporaneous and lagged unemploy-
ment rates, the prime consumer interest rate, as well as debt-income ratios
and housing equity.
We consider several different specifications in Table 3.3. We include both
contemporaneous and lagged unemployment, but different combinations of con-
temporaneous and lagged consumer interest rates and debt-income ratios. Al-
though some of the regressors appear to be insignificant in the last column,
they are significant by themselves. To avoid omitted variable bias, we include
them in our specification (see column 10 in Table 3.3).
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Table 3.3: Determinants of National Annual Insolvency: 1980-2011
̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet ̂Ins.Ratet
̂Unemp.Ratet 1.045*** 1.084*** 0.887*** 0.933*** 1.115*** 1.028*** 1.114*** 0.976*** 1.160*** 1.198***
(7.21) (6.7) (5.59) (5.33) (6.23) (6.26) (6.06) (5.83) (6.63) (6.57)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 -0.808*** -0.756*** -0.552** -0.490* -0.386 -0.33 -0.392 -0.393 -0.273 -0.241
(-5.52) (-4.35) (-2.96) (-2.32) (-1.93) (-1.62) (-1.93) (-1.91) (-1.37) (-1.18)
̂Cons.Ratet 0.101 0.117 0.374 0.0369 0.31 0.011 0.253 0.294
(0.57) (0.65) (1.89) (0.22) (1.63) (0.06) (1.24) (1.39)
̂Cons.Ratet−1 0.336* 0.344* 0.427* 0.580** 0.402* 0.480** 0.605** 0.656**
(2.07) (2.08) (2.73) (3.27) (2.57) (2.82) (3.5) (3.54)
̂CC/DI t 1.860* 1.297 1.001
(2.37) (0.57) (0.43)
̂CC/DI t−1 2.081* 1.722* 3.529
(2.51) (2.08) (1.48)
M̂/DI t 1.454* 0.172 0.425
(2.18) (0.09) (0.22)
̂M/DI t−1 2.304 -2.559
(2.01) (0.81)
N 32 32 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
adj. R2 0.652 0.644 0.680 0.674 0.721 0.727 0.713 0.707 0.745 0.741
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,*** p < 0.001
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Table 3.4: Correlations between Annual Variables - 1980-2011 - Deviations from Trend
Ins.
Rate(t)
Unemp
Rate
(t)
Unemp
Rate
(t-1)
Cons.
Rate
(t)
Cons.
Rate
(t-1)
CC/
DI (t)
CC/
DI
(t-1)
Mort/
DI (t)
Mort/
DI
(t-1)
Ins. Rate(t) 1.00
Unemp Rate(t) 0.58 1.00
Unemp Rate(t-1) -0.32 0.37 1.00
Cons. Rate (t) -0.05 -0.57 -0.61 1.00
Cons. Rate (t-1) 0.62 0.17 -0.54 0.14 1.00
CC/DI(t) -0.14 -0.22 0.11 -0.31 -0.28 1.00
CC/DI(t-1) -0.21 -0.55 -0.25 0.45 -0.39 0.23 1.00
Mort/DI(t) -0.14 -0.34 -0.02 -0.15 -0.22 0.95 0.28 1.00
Mort/DI(t-1) -0.12 -0.50 -0.30 0.52 -0.26 0.14 0.95 0.21 1.00
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Table 3.5: Correlations between Quarterly Variables – 1991Q1-2012Q1 – Deviations from Trend
Bky q1 q2 q3 UR
(t)
UR
(t-1)
UR
(t-2)
CR
(t)
CR
(t-1)
CR
(t-2)
CC/
DI
(t)
CC/
DI
(t-1)
CC/
DI
(t-2)
M/
DI
(t)
M/
DI
(t-1)
M/
DI
(t-2)
Bky Rate 1.00
q1 -0.02 1.00
q2 0.27 -0.34 1.00
q3 -0.15 -0.34 -0.33 1.00
Unemp Rate (t) 0.42 0.49 0.04 -0.07 1.00
Unemp Rate (t-1) 0.35 -0.49 0.51 0.05 0.40 1.00
Unemp Rate (t-2) -0.07 -0.13 -0.43 0.51 0.32 0.43 1.00
Cons Rate (t) -0.53 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.68 -0.63 -0.50 1.00
Cons Rate (t-1) -0.37 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.64 -0.69 -0.63 0.87 1.00
Cons Rate (t-2) -0.16 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.50 -0.64 -0.68 0.66 0.87 1.00
CC/DI (t) 0.38 -0.37 -0.02 0.20 -0.04 0.29 0.25 -0.28 -0.30 -0.25 1.00
CC/DI (t-1) 0.29 0.21 -0.34 -0.05 0.13 -0.07 0.22 -0.22 -0.25 -0.27 0.61 1.00
CC/DI (t-3) 0.34 0.18 0.24 -0.37 0.15 0.10 -0.13 -0.10 -0.20 -0.22 0.36 0.60 1.00
Mort/DI (t) 0.10 -0.36 -0.06 0.23 0.02 0.35 0.38 -0.31 -0.39 -0.37 0.65 0.26 0.02 1.00
Mort/DI (t-1) -0.01 0.17 -0.36 -0.05 0.16 0.02 0.35 -0.28 -0.31 -0.39 0.32 0.65 0.27 0.58 1.00
Mort/DI (t-2) 0.05 0.21 0.18 -0.35 0.21 0.13 0.00 -0.15 -0.27 -0.31 0.12 0.32 0.65 0.32 0.58 1.00
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The coefficient estimates in Table 3.3 are not necessarily a good proxy for
the quantitative contribution of different variables to insolvency fluctuations
as the covariates are themselves correlated (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2), and differ
in their variance. To asses the quantitative contribution, we report a variance
decomposition. The first column in Table 3.6 reports the (adjusted) R-squared
from the regression of the insolvency rate on each variable alone.16 Individ-
ually, the unemployment rate and the lagged consumer prime rate play the
largest role in accounting for fluctuations in insolvencies. However, there is
scope for interpretation as to which variable plays the largest role. The last col-
umn of Table 3.6 reports the Semi-partial R-squared, which is the R-squared
from the regression with all of the variables in Table 3.6 less the R-squared
from the regression omitting that covariate.17 While the contemporaneous un-
employment rate and the lagged consumer rate have the most explanatory
power, contemporaneous unemployment now accounts for a larger fraction of
the cyclical variation in insolvency filings.
To probe the robustness of these findings, we examine the 1990 Q1 to 2012
Q1 period for which we have quarterly insolvency filings. Broadly speaking,
16This specification used maximizes Akaike information criterion.
17The partial R-squared indicates how much unique information about insolvency in one
covariate is not captured by the other covariates. In this sense, it is a conservative estimate.
The partial R-squared indicates the fraction of the maximum possible improvement in Rˆ2 that
is contributed by covariate k.
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Table 3.6: Variance Decomposition for National Regression with Annual Data:
1980-2011
Individual Covariate Rˆ2 Partial Rˆ2 Semi-Partial Rˆ2
Unemp 0.34 0.65 0.40
Unemp(t-1) 0.11 0.13 0.03
Cons Rate (t-1) 0.39 0.32 0.10
CC/DI (t-1) 0.06 0.21 0.05
Mort/DI(t) 0.04 0.08 0.02
All 0.79
Table 3.7: Variance Decomposition for National Regression with Quarterly
Data: 1991Q1-2012Q1
Individual Covariate Rˆ2 Partial Rˆ2 Semi-Partial Rˆ2
q1 0.00 0.02 0.01
q2 0.06 0.00 0.00
q3 0.02 0.00 0.00
Unemp 0.18 0.06 0.02
Unemp(t-2) 0.55 0.17 0.08
Cons Rate (t) 0.28 0.13 0.06
CC/DI (t) 0.14 0.02 0.01
CC/DI (t-1) 0.08 0.09 0.04
Mort/DI(t-1) 0.00 0.09 0.04
All 0.61
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Table 3.8: Determinants of National Quarterly Bankruptcy: 1991Q1-2012Q1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
̂Bk′y.Ratet ̂Bk′y.Ratet ̂Bk′y.Ratet ̂Bk′y.Ratet ̂Bk′y.Ratet ̂Bk′y.Ratet ̂Bk′y.Ratet ̂Bk′y.Ratet
First -0.0379 -0.0378 -0.0348 -0.0369 -0.0242 -0.0321 -0.0289 -0.0392
Quarter (-1.02) (-1.09) (-1.69) (-1.65) (-1.14) (-1.49) (-1.41) (-1.22)
Second -0.0142 0.0146 0.00451 0.00713 0.00477 0.0152 0.0177 0.0334
Quarter (-0.33) (0.37) (0.23) (0.33) (0.24) (0.85) (0.88) (0.89)
Third 0.0173 0.0155 0.0235 0.0286 0.0171 0.0155 -0.00213 0.00111
(0.70) (0.63) (1.14) (1.36) (0.82) (0.81) (-0.09) (0.05)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.657** 0.319 0.299 0.402* 0.370* 0.366* 0.577*** 0.435*
(3.22) (1.57) (1.76) (2.52) (2.38) (2.41) (3.82) (2.39)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 0.313 -0.0436 -0.114
(0.93) (-0.13) (-0.39)
̂Unemp.Ratet−2 -0.504* -0.478 -0.591*** -0.627*** -0.542*** -0.529*** -0.334 -0.291
(-2.07) (-1.90) (-3.93) (-4.55) (-3.93) (-3.89) (-1.71) (-1.32)
̂Cons.Ratet -0.328** -0.316*** -0.246*** -0.257*** -0.255*** -0.323**
(-3.22) (-4.53) (-3.63) (-3.89) (-3.98) (-3.33)
̂Cons.Ratet−1 -0.00201 -0.234* 0.0836
(-0.01) (-2.38) (0.62)
̂Cons.Ratet−2 0.0505 0.173 0.0655
(0.47) (1.87) (0.66)
̂CC/DI t 1.348 1.472 1.131 2.027** 0.419
(1.58) (1.47) (1.38) (2.96) (0.31)
̂CC/DI t−1 0.832 2.455** 1.607
(0.79) (2.68) (0.93)
̂CC/DI t−2 0.656 2.341* 2.046* 1.987
(0.78) (2.26) (2.49) (1.46)
̂Mort/DI t 0.0994 1.299
(0.07) (0.79)
̂Mort/DI t−1 0.0279 -2.338** -1.448
(0.02) (-2.67) (-0.72)
̂Mort/DI t−2 -2.533 -2.446** -2.002
(-1.95) (-2.71) (-1.31)
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
adj. R 2 0.282 0.405 0.424 0.524 0.556 0.561 0.508 0.553
the results from the quarterly regressions also suggest that movements in un-
employment rates and consumer interest rates play a significant role in ac-
counting for insolvencies (see Table 3.8). However, as Table 3.7 shows,18 with
quarterly data it is difficult to robustly identify the quantitative contribution of
unemployment, consumer interest rates and debt levels to cyclical movements
in insolvency filings.
18The appropriate lags in this specification were chosen to maximize the Schwarz Bayesian
Information Criterion, and then the Akaike information criterion was used to select the indi-
vidual covariates.
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3.2.3 Lending Standards over the Business Cycle
Although direct measures of lending standards are limited, there is suggestive
evidence that lending standards tightened during the recession. Credit bureau
data provide indirect, but suggestive, evidence that riskier borrowers faced
much tighter access to credit during the recent recession. We lack a direct
proxy for consumer lending standards.19
Instead, we examine credit bureau report data. Credit bureau data provides
suggestive insights into how credit availability varied during the recent reces-
sion. Services [2012] summarizes information on credit inquiries and credit
extended for Canadian consumers. Figure 3.8 shows the growth rate of bal-
ances, total limit and the number of accounts from the prior year. Consistent
with the aggregate data, the growth in credit balances dropped during the re-
cession. However, credit utilization (balances relative to credit limits) grew
during the recession, as the growth of total available credit was half that of
balances.
Utilization likely increased during the recession and initial recovery for two
reasons. First, some borrowers (perhaps in response to negative income shocks)
increased their borrowing using existing credit lines. Second, accounts were
closed. It is unlikely that accounts were closed due to less borrower demand
since the number of inquiries rose during the onset of the recession. Instead,
19Although not directly related, both the U.S. consumer and Canadian business lending sur-
veys suggested that loan conditions tighten during recessions.
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this suggests that lenders moved to tighten credit standards. During the early
stages of the recovery, both the number of accounts closed and inquiries fell.
Services [2012] indicates that much of the increase in utilization can be at-
tributed to credit cards and unsecured revolving credit, instead of auto finance
secured revolving credit and bank installment loans. Moreover, this tightening
of lending standards appears to be concentrated amongst higher risk borrow-
ers. Indeed, deRitis, Ackcay, and Kernytsky [2012] report that credit origina-
tions for the riskiest borrowers fell by a staggering 50 % during the recession.
It is important to consider this composition effect when interpreting interest
rates movements. Figure 3.9 plots the BOC’s weekly effective interest and
consumer loan rate.20 During the recession, the consumer interest rate spread
over the weekly effective interest rate blew out. This is consistent with lenders
perceiving greater risk during the financial crisis.
3.2.4 City Empirics
National unemployment maybe correlated with variables like net worth, which
in turn affects insolvency. To explore the role that job-loss plays, we consider
68 city panel in Table 3.9. The idea being that local unemployment conditions
are the best proxy for true job-loss, because they are less related to national
conditions. Our results are consistent with the national regressions above. In
20The effective interest rate for households is a weighted-average of various mortgage and
consumer credit interest rates. The weights are derived from residential mortgage and con-
sumer credit data, adjusted for additional information provided by financial institutions.
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Figure 3.8: Credit Availability (Excluding Mortgages): Year-Over-Year Growth
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Table 3.9: 68 Cities, annual, 1987–2011
Ins.Rate c,t Ins.Ratec,t Ins.Ratec,t Ins.Ratec,t
Unemp.Rate c,t 0.292∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.0273) (0.0241) (0.0249) (0.0287)
Unemp.Rate c,t−1 0.0982∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 0.0246 0.0697∗
(0.0268) (0.0243) (0.0262) (0.0282)
Cons.Int.Ratet 0.345∗∗∗ -0.0904∗
(0.0426) (0.0364)
Cons.Int.Ratet−1 0.366∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(0.0376) (0.0340)
GDPt -5.722∗∗∗ -5.508∗∗∗
(0.288) (0.242)
GDPt−1 0.889∗∗ 3.331∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.245)
N 1600 1600 1600 1600
Adj. R2 0.555 0.320 0.445 0.504
fact, if we compare the specification with unemployment, the consumer borrow-
ing rate and their respective lags, we find that total effect of unemployment is
near 0.6, while at the national level it is near 0.5 (see the fourth specification
in Table 3.3).21
Housing and Insolvency
One factor that could influence a consumer’s access to credit is their net worth.
Since home equity is the main asset of many households, changes in house
21We also replicated our analysis at the provincial-level using data from same time-period.
The total effect of unemployment was higher - at just under 0.8. For brevity, these results
are omitted. One reason the total effect might differ is because the provincial regression is
weighted by population.
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prices could thus significantly impact the amount that households could bor-
row. This has potentially become even more important, as home equity lines
of credits have become an increasing large part of consumer credit in Canada
(MacGee [2012]).
To investigate the impact of changes in house prices on insolvency filings,
we combine data from the Teranet-National House Price Index for 11 Cana-
dian cities with city insolvency and unemployment rates. Teranet’s National
Bank House Price Index is a price index based on the repeat sales method
(so as to control for quality) for single family homes, and covers eleven Cana-
dian metropolitan areas: Victoria, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg,
Hamilton, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec and Halifax. Unfortunately, our
house price data is only available for years from 1999 onward.
Table 3.10 shows that city house price growth is negatively related to city
insolvency growth rates. This relationship holds even controlling for the con-
sumer lending rate. While one might be concerned that this is simply picking
up negative city-level economic shocks, the fact that house prices and unem-
ployment are negatively related for only half of the cities suggests that house
prices are not just picking up the effect of changes in households’ local employ-
ment possibilities.
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Table 3.10: Determinants of Annual City Insolvency: 1999-2010
Ins.Ratec,t Ins.Ratec,t Ins.Ratec,t Ins.Ratec,t
Unemp.Rate c,t 0.118 0.308∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.116
(0.0764) (0.0610) (0.0769) (0.0781)
Unemp.Rate c,t−1 -0.0383 -0.213∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.0187
(0.0702) (0.0488) (0.0607) (0.0724)
Cons.Int.Ratet 0.286∗ 0.0342
(0.127) (0.125)
Cons.Int.Ratet−1 -0.217 -0.114
(0.120) (0.115)
GDPt -3.621∗∗∗ -3.009∗∗∗
(0.694) (0.618)
GDPt−1 1.738∗ 1.343∗
(0.775) (0.652)
House Pricesc,t -1.379∗∗∗ -1.489∗∗∗ -1.555∗∗∗ -1.312∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.176) (0.190) (0.170)
N 121 121 121 121
adj. R2 0.737 0.653 0.650 0.719
3.2.5 Was the 2008 Recession Different?
Before examining the filer-level data in the following section, we ask whether
the jump in bankruptcy filings during the 2008 recession is consistent with past
recessions. This question is of interest both to evaluate whether the lessons we
draw from the micro data likely apply to earlier recessions, and since the rise
in consumer debt prior to the Great Recession may have left households more
vulnerable to adverse shocks than during previous recessions.
To tackle this question, we generate in- and out-of-sample forecasts for fil-
ings. We consider two regression specifications, one which regresses filings on
99
unemployment (current and lag), the consumer lending rate (lag), and a sec-
ond which adds (lagged) consumer credit/disposable income.22 This highlights
whether the growth in debt impacts our conditional forecasts for the level of
filings, because debt levels are rising over time [MacGee, 2012].
Figure 3.10 plots both out of sample forecast (using annual data up to 2002)
and the actual data. Arguably, neither regression provides a good out of sample
forecast, as excluding the growth of consumer debt underestimates the jump in
filings during the recession, while including growth in debt over-predicts filings
in all years since 2002 but the recession.
An alternative approach is to look at the in sample fit for the entire sample
(i.e., 1980 to 2012). As can be seen from Figure 3.11, in this case including
the growth of consumer debt has little impact on the predicted growth rate
of insolvencies. Interestingly, the estimates closely predict the jump in filings
during the 2008 recession, but underestimates the growth in filings during the
90-92 recession.23 Overall, our take-away from this is that the response in
filings during the 2008 recession seems in line with past episodes.
22We choose to analyze growth rates, because the HP filter adjusts historical deviations when
we include additional data, and thus makes comparisons more transparent.
23It is difficult to attribute this episode to consumer debt, income or inter-
est rates. Instead, it is possible that early nineties were subject to much
more restructuring of the private sector, which resulted in more long-run jobless-
ness, and consequently insolvencies. For another exposition of this argument,
see http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2001/01/publications/speeches/canada-economic-future-what-
have-we-learned/
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Figure 3.10: Out-of-Sample Forecast
Figure 3.11: In-Sample Forecast
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3.3 Characteristics of Filers over the Recession
We now turn to unique data on the characteristics of filers collected by the Of-
fice of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB). Our analysis focuses on how
the mean and median characteristics of the population of filers evolve over four
years: prior to the economic slowdown (July 1, 2007 – June 20, 2008), the onset
of the recession (July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009), the initial recovery (July 1 2009
– June 30, 2010) and the continuing recovery (July 1, 2010-June 30, 2011).
Although the data period is relatively short, it spans the recent recession. Fur-
thermore, it contains rich details on socio-demographic characteristics, income
at the time filing and household liabilities and non-financial assets and
The findings broadly support our analysis of the aggregate data. We find
that the fraction of filers reporting they are unemployed rises over 2007-11,
and accounts for nearly half of the rise in filings. In addition, the fraction of
filers who are homeowners rises, consistent with the negative relationship be-
tween house prices and filings. More generally, the filer data indicates that the
rise in filings was accompanied by an increase in the number of “middle-class”
filers. Besides the rise in homeownership, this is reflected in the rise in the
fraction of filers receiving unemployment benefits (suggesting stronger ties to
the labour market given the weeks worked required to qualify for unemploy-
ment benefits), higher monthly income and debts of filers during the recession,
as well as an increase in the number of middle-aged filers. 24 Both the mix
24We compare the filer population to the general population using Statistics Canada data,
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of debt (increased share of housing debt) and higher debt levels suggest that
many of the filers during the recession had higher pre-recession income levels.
3.3.1 Micro Data on Filers
The database was provided by the OSB, and contains all electronic filings from
January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2011, and is based on data collected by Cana-
dian bankruptcy trustees and proposal administrators from filers. The data is
mainly collected on two required forms in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act:
Form 79, the Statement of Affairs (Non-Business Bankruptcy/Proposal), and
Form 65, the Monthly Income and Expense Statement of the Bankrupt/Debtor
and the Family Unit and Information (or Amended Information) Concerning
the Financial Situation of the Individual Bankrupt. Our data include socio-
demographic characteristics (age, family size), income at the time of filing and
detailed data on households’ debts and assets.
The availability of these data reflects the move to electronic from “paper”
filings. While in 2005 only 56.6% of all filings were filed electronically, by 2007
(2009) 96% (99%) of all filings were completed electronically. Thus, our sam-
ple includes nearly all filers immediately prior to and since the beginning of
the most recent recession. Our dataset contains information on 669,153 insol-
vency filings made electronically from January 1, 2005 to June 30, 2011 (out of
and find that these changes are not driven by shifts in the characteristics of the Canadian
populace. We hope use the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics to compare the population
of filers to the general population, but the release of necessary data is several years behind the
OSB and not available at the time of writing.
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735,311 total filings). Overall, the quality of the dataset (for the questions we
use) is quite good, and there are few missing observations.25 For example, age
and gender are each omitted from less 0.02% of applications.
The sample we analyze contains 517,651 insolvency filings: 404,511 bankrupt-
cies and 113,140 consumer proposals. Under a consumer proposal, an insolvent
individual typically pays back more of the debt. In return, they are granted
more flexible terms, and they have a better credit report.26 Of the proposals
during this period, 110,158 were Division II debtors, and 2,982 were Division I
debtors.27
Since the project focuses on consumer insolvencies, 22,570 filings that were
classified as business are removed from the sample. The classification is deter-
mined by whether the majority of filer’s debt is consumer or business related,
as attributed by the trustee or administrator. Even if business debt is not the
primary debt on the balance sheet, it may have contributed to the insolvency.
For this reason, 128,242 individuals who indicated they ran a business in the
last five years were removed. Finally, there are several records with excep-
tionally high liabilities, whose inclusion materially changes the average debt
level of filers in a quarter. To address this, 690 filers with liabilities exceeding
$1,000,000 are dropped from our sample.
25 One exception is the assets and liabilities of filers, which code zero as missing values.
26There are also limitations to some professionals if they file for bankruptcy.
27Division I occurs when the debts are greater than $250,000, where Division II occurs when
debts are less than this amount.
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3.3.2 Insolvency Filings between 2007 and 2011
Before examining shifts in the distribution of filers, we briefly summarize sev-
eral key aggregate measures. Given the substantial seasonality in the data,
we report the evolution of filings over one-year periods. To mitigate concerns
about sample selection, we focus on the 4 years starting in July 1, 2007 and
ending June 30, 2011.28 The first year (July 1, 2007 - June 30, 2008) precedes
the recession, while the second coincides with its onset, and the last two (July
1, 2009 - June 30, 2010 and July 1, 2010 - June 30, 2011) the slow recovery.
As can be seen from Table 3.11, insolvency filings initially rose and then lev-
eled off over these years. Comparing the growth rates from year to year, insol-
vency rate rose by 29%, 5% and -12% in the second, third and fourth years, re-
spectively. Bankruptcies initially rose quicker than proposals, although propos-
als share of total filings continued. This trend may reflect the 2009 bankruptcy
reform, as proposals continued to rise during 2010 and 2011 even as bankrupt-
cies declined.
3.3.3 Income
In this section, we document how filer income compares to the general popu-
lation over the four-year period. Due to the data reporting windows used by
Statistics Canada, this analysis focuses on calendar years.
28One concern may be that trustees that switched to electronic filings later may be concen-
trated in some geographical regions.
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Table 3.12 compares the nominal net-income of filers and the general pop-
ulation. While insolvency filers income tends to be well below the population
average, the gap narrowed during the recession.29 In 2007, unattached indi-
viduals earn about two-third of their counterparts in the general population.
The income differences are much larger for filers with families, who earn just
over two-fifths of the average non-filer’s income.
29While reported incomes are substantially less than the general population, more work
must be done to understand the income levels prior to filing. In Section B.1 we make progress
in this endeavor by inferring income using the characteristics of filers.
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Table 3.11: Annual Filing Rates from July 2007 to June 2011
Period Insolvency Rate Consumer Proposal Rate Bankruptcy Rate
07/2007-06/ 2008 3.99 0.86 3.13
07/2008-06/ 2009 5.14 1.12 4.02
07/2009-06/ 2010 5.38 1.48 3.90
07/2010-06/ 2011 4.73 1.61 3.11
Table 3.12: Average Family Net-Income
All Family Units Unattached Individuals Families
Year Filers ($) Pop ($) Ratio (%) Filers ($) Pop ($) Ratio (%) Filers ($) Pop ($) Ratio (%)
2007 25861 59190 43.7 19472 30599 63.6 32186 74107 43.4
2008 27287 61408 44.4 20212 31830 63.5 34177 76883 44.5
2009 28539 61766 46.2 20613 32307 63.8 35564 77281 46.0
2010 29493 63000 46.8 21077 33000 63.9 36574 78800 46.4
Source: OSB and Cansim Table 202-0603. Family members income is counted even if the application
is not joint.
Table 3.13: Median Total Nominal Income
Year Filer Net Total Income Taxfiler and Dependent Total Income Ratio (%)
2007 24,084 27,960 86.1
2008 24,096 28,920 83.3
2009 24,108 28,840 83.6
2010 24,120 29,250 82.5
Source: OSB and Cansim Table 111-0008.
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Table 3.12 documents what might seem surprising – the rise in filings dur-
ing the recession saw the gap between the average income of filers and non-
filers narrow. This suggests that the recession may have pushed more “middle-
class” filers into insolvency. This is consistent with the changes in composition
of families (discussed in the next section) or changes in the types of families
filing for insolvency. Income growth amongst the population of unattached fil-
ers appears to be keeping pace with the income growth amongst unattached
individuals in the population. However, income growth of families filing for in-
solvency was greater than the general population. As a result, the gap between
filing families and the general population appeared to close over the recession.
This effect was amplified by the fact that the filers with families grew faster
than did unattached filers during the recession.30
An examination of median income also suggests a shift in the composition
of filers during the recession. Comparing median incomes to the general popu-
lation is difficult, since Statistics Canada median income measure is gross in-
come for taxfilers with dependents.31 Table 3.13 comparison median incomes.
30It is worth noting that current filer incomes are lower (relative to mean household income)
than previous Canadian studies, suggesting that the average income of the typical bankrupt
may have fallen over the past twenty years. Schwartz [1999] reports mean (median) income
of bankrupts of $35, 271 ($29, 575), while Brighton and Connadis [1982] reports mean pre-tax
income of $36, 583 (all in 2007 dollars). However, these values should be interpreted with care.
In both surveys a number of respondents did not report income, and most respondents in 1977
listed their net (post-tax) income. The mean net income was only 65% of the gross mean, which
suggests that the true mean income could have been even lower in 1977.
31A dependent is a member of a family who did not file a personal income tax return for the
referenced year.
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Table 3.13 shows how insolvency filer income changes differed from tax filer in-
comes. While we see virtually no nominal growth in median incomes amongst
filers, median incomes for the Canadian population did continue to grow. Com-
paring this pattern against the one in Table 3.12 suggests that higher income
families are responsible for the growth in filer income.
While average income provides considerable insight, changes in the dis-
tribution of filer income provides additional information into the dynamics of
bankruptcy over the business cycle. To further understand distributional in-
come changes, we plot net-income histograms of filers for each year. Figure
3.12 suggests that while the distribution of filer earnings across the past four
years is similar, there has been a slight increase in the fraction of (relatively)
higher income filers.
Projected Income
While our data provides rich details on socio-demographic characteristics, in-
come at the time filing, and household liabilities and non-financial assets, we
lack information on filer’s earnings history prior to the filing. This complicates
the interpretation of changes in filer income during the recession, as this may
hide larger deviations from “regular” income due to unemployment.
To address this, we use data from the 2005 Survey of Financial Security
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Figure 3.12: Real Monthly Family Income Distribution Relative to 07Q3-08Q2
(a)
(b)
(c)
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to estimate the relationship between household characteristics and total net-
family income.32 We then use the estimated coefficients to impute the expected
income levels of filers, which we scale by mean income growth (see the Ap-
pendix B for more details on our imputation procedure).33
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 plot the mean projected income and the mean re-
ported income, by age cohort, for filers with and without mortgage debt, re-
spectively. Comparing the two plots, provides two insights. First, filers with-
out mortgage debt have lower average income than those with mortgage debt.
This is not surprising, since homeowner’s income is typically higher (on aver-
age) than renters. What is surprising is the different gaps between projected
income and reported income for filers with and without mortgage debt. For
filers without mortgage debt, the gap between projected and reported income
is small, and there is no trend over the recession. In contrast, the projected
income of filers with mortgage debt is well above their reported income, with a
larger gap for older households. This suggests that income shocks may be a sig-
nificant contributor to filings, particularly for homeowners. The second is that
the gap between income and filing and our projected income widens during the
recession, before narrowing as filings decline.
32This is the only common income variable between our OBS data and the SFS.
33Due to issues with selection, one should be cautious in interpreting levels. However, our
primary interest is related to the changes in the projection of income which should be less
influenced by any change in selection.
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Figure 3.13: Projected Income with Mortgage Debt
Figure 3.14: Projected Income without Mortgage Debt
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3.3.4 Employment
To investigate the role of unemployment, we examine two income components
reported by filers: whether the filer reports employment insurance (EI) income,
and whether the filer reports zero labour earnings (which we categorize as
unemployed). Table 3.14 shows that the fraction of filers receiving EI tracks
the rise and decline in both the filing rate and the unemployment rate (compare
with Figure 3.3). Interestingly, the fraction of unemployed filers, (i.e. filers
reporting zero income) also rises. This is consistent with the view that one
factor in the high levels of filings in 2010 and 2011 may have been prolonged
spells of unemployment which resulted in the exhaustion of EI benefits.
Table 3.15 shows the direct contribution from filers who we classify as un-
employed. In our sample, the rise in the total number of filers ranged between
16,638 and 27,626 from the year prior to the recession. Similarly, the rise in
the total number of filers which we classify as unemployed appears to be about
8,206-12,473. Taken together, unemployed filers account for nearly half of the
total rise in filers. There are two factors which suggest this may be a lower
bound estimate of the contribution of job loss. First, this measure does not
capture individuals who lost a job but then obtained new employment at lower
levels of income. Second, there are other factors, such as lending standards,
which may be disproportionately affecting individuals who have lost their job.
We return to the impact of lending standards in Section 3.2.3.
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Table 3.14: Labor Force Statistics of Filers
Period Fraction Receiving EI (%) Fraction Unemployed (%)
07/2007-06/ 2008 7.1 34.2
07/2008-06/ 2009 8.7 35.5
07/2009-06/ 2010 9.4 36.5
07/2010-06/ 2011 7.9 36.7
Table 3.15: Contribution from Unemployment
Time Filers w. No Emp. Total Contribution
Period Income or Collect EI Filers (%)
07/2007-06/2008 27040 77122
07/2008-06/2009 36320 99621 41
07/2009-06/2010 39513 104748 45
07/2010-06/2011 35246 93760 49
Table 3.16: Filer Age
Period Age
07/2007-06/ 2008 42.9
07/2008-06/ 2009 43.3
07/2009-06/ 2010 44.3
07/2010-06/ 2011 45.5
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3.3.5 Demographic Characteristics of Filers
The data offers considerable details on filer’s socio-demographic characteris-
tics. To the extent that household characteristics such as home ownership and
age are correlated with average lifetime earnings, these data also suggests that
a larger fraction of filers during the recession are from the “middle-class”.
Age
The average age of filers rose during the recent recession, with a cumulative
increase of 6% (see Table 3.16). The aging population was a minor contributor,
as the median age in the general population rose from 39.2 to 39.9 (less than
a 2% increase) from 2007 to 2011.34 Instead, filer age increased for two rea-
sons: (1) middle aged households seem to have been especially impacted by the
recession; and (2) a long-run trend towards (more) older filers.
The contribution of middle-aged households to the rise in insolvency filings
can be seen from the plots of filing rates by age cohorts in Figure 3.15. Not only
did the older middle aged cohorts filing rates rise, but they have also declined
less quickly during the initial years of the recovery. This is consistent with
the view that some households faced persistent earnings shocks or prolonged
spells of unemployment. The 45 to 54 age cohort performed particularly poorly,
as they were the only cohort to see a decline in average real income relative
to 2007 (see Table 3.17). Furthermore, this cohort also experienced the largest
34See Cansim Table 051-0001.
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Figure 3.15: Insolvency Rates by Age Cohort
and most sustained rise in unemployment. Compared to previous studies of
Canadian bankrupts by Brighton and Connadis [1982] and Schwartz [1999],
our data suggests a longer run trend towards filings by older bankrupts (see
Table 3.18.
The shift towards older (working-aged) filers is a likely factor in the shift to-
wards more “middle-class” filers. Table 3.19 shows that age and unemployment
amongst different age cohorts in the general population. In general, income in-
creases with age until ages above 55. Similarly, unemployment decreases until
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Table 3.17: Age Cohort Labour Force Attachment Relative to 2007
Relative Income Relative Unemployment
Age Cohort 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011
20 to 24 years 1.04 1.02 1.01 0.98 1.02 1.39 1.33 1.26
25 to 34 years 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.03 0.98 1.39 1.36 1.23
35 to 44 years 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.06 0.99 1.36 1.33 1.17
45 to 54 years 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.04 1.44 1.39 1.27
55 to 64 years 0.99 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.08 1.38 1.32 1.32
Source: Cansim Tables 202-0407 and 282-0001.
Table 3.18: Age Profile of Bankrupts: Canada
Age 18-29 30-49 50 + avg.
1977 0.90 1.10 0.21 0.78
1994 1.98 3.92 0.98 2.45
1997 5.20 4.59 1.49 3.74
Source: 1977 is from Brighton and Connadis [1982], 1994 is from Ramsay [1999] (On-
tario only), while 1997 is from Schwartz [1999]. The filing rate is per 1000 18 and
above, and is for consumer bankruptcies only (consumer proposals in 1997 were not
included).
Table 3.19: Income and Employment by Age in 2007
Age Group Average Income of Recipients Unemployment
20 to 24 years 17003 8.68
25 to 34 years 35956 5.67
35 to 44 years 45805 5.11
45 to 54 years 50172 4.47
55 to 64 years 41067 5.04
Source: Cansim Tables 202-0407 and 282-0001.
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ages above 55.
Age and Filing during Recessions
The lag between rising unemployment and the rise in filings differs by age
cohort. To examine this, we construct a provincial panel as any national panel
is too short in time and unemployment by age-cohort is not available at the
city level. We regress the quarterly provincial insolvency rate on current and
lagged provincial unemployment rates for five year age cohorts from 2007Q1 to
2011Q2:
̂Insolvency Ratet,p,a = ̂Unemployment Ratet,p,a+ ̂Unemployment Ratet−1,p,a+t,p,a.
The regression estimates (see Table 3.22) indicate that filing rates of older filers
are more responsive to lagged unemployment rates than younger filers. Strik-
ingly, the coefficient on lagged unemployment is not significant at the 10% level
for households below 50, but is for older households.
3.3.6 Gender
The recession saw a quickening of the trend towards an increase in the fraction
of female filers.35 Indeed, as Table 3.21 shows, during the recovery from the
recession, there were more females than males amongst primary filers.
35During our sample, the average Canadian working female earned between 64.3 and 68.6
compared to the average male.36 Schwartz (1999) reports that the median debt to income ratio
of single men was 1.36 and for women 1.31. However, the median unsecured debt to income
ratio was 1.16 for women versus 0.93 for women. Single women also had larger families than
did single men.
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Table 3.20: Unemployment and Insolvency Rate - Age Cohorts: 07Q1-11Q2
Ages
25-29
Ages
30-34
Ages
35-39
Ages
40-44
Ages
45-49
Ages
50-54
Ages
55-59
Ages
60-64
q1 -0.0524* -0.0783*** -0.0662*** -0.0704*** -0.0459 ** -0.0298 -0.0223 0.00427
(-2.40) (-4.04) (-3.65) (-3.89) (-2.66) (-1.56) (-1.25) -0.21
q2 0.0206 0.0389* 0.0484** 0.0362* 0.0548** 0.0047 0.0185 0.00359
(-0.98) (-2.09) (-2.74) (-2.08) (-3.23) (-0.27) (-1.1) (-0.18)
q3 0.0153 0.0192 0.0168 0.013 -0.00946 0.00564 0.0209 0.0095
(-0.7) (-1.02) (-0.86) (-0.75) (-0.53) (-0.31) (-1.17) (-0.46)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.333***
Ages 25-29 (-4.48)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 -0.0188
Ages 25-29 (-0.24)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.408***
Ages 30-34 (-6.68)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 0.0807
Ages 30-34 (-1.25)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.368***
Ages 35-39 (-6.17)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 0.11
Ages 35-39 (-1.75)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.383***
Ages 40-44 (-7.18)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 0.103
Ages 40-44 (-1.74)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.341***
Ages 45-49 (-5.91)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 0.0537
Ages 45-49 (-0.9)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.316***
Ages 50-54 (-5.68)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 0.145*
Ages 50-54 (-2.5)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.353***
Ages 55-59 (-6.37)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 0.252***
Ages 55-59 (-4.44)
̂Unemp.Ratet 0.105
Ages 60-64 (-1.95)
̂Unemp.Ratet−1 0.184**
Ages 60-64 (-3.29)
N 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
adj. R 2 0.106 0.317 0.27 0.322 0.273 0.261 0.297 0.083
Dependent variable is the HP-filtered insolvency rate for the respective age cohort.
Regressions are weighted by provincial population. t statistics in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,*** p < 0.001
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This relative decline in male filers reflects a longer term trend. Figure 3.16
plots the fraction of all female filers over time and fits a quadratic function
that accounts for seasonality. Unlike Table 3.22 which uses the gender of the
primary filer, in Figure 3.16 we account for the gender of the second filer in joint
filings. While the shift towards female filings is visible prior to the recession in
our data, it is worth noting that the pre-recession share of femaile filers is well
above the roughly 30% estimate reported by [Brighton and Connadis, 1982] for
1977, or the [Schwartz, 1999] estimate of 40% in 1997.37
The trend towards more female filers seems to have accelerated during the
recession. This may seem puzzling in light of popular discussions of a “man-
cession”, which focused on the greater sensitivity of males cyclical income risk.
Indeed, male unemployment jumped by 3% points from 2007 to 2009, while
female unemployment only jumped by 1.4% points.38 However, as discuss in
the next section, significant changes in family structure interact with gender
differences in unemployment dynamics.
3.3.7 Family Structure
Filers are less likely to be in a permanent relationship than the typical Cana-
dian. While 62% of Canadians cohabited in 2004 (based on the SFS 2005),
during the four years of our filer sample the highest rate of cohabitation was
40% (see Table 3.22). However, the fraction of cohabiting filers including those
with children rose during the recession, with a corresponding decline in the
37 A similar trend in the change of filer gender is found in United States (see Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt [2010].
38See Cansim Table 282-0086.
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Figure 3.16: Fraction of Female Filers
Table 3.21: Gender of Primary Filers
Period Male
07/2007-06/ 2008 51.7%
07/2008-06/2009 50.6%
07/2009-06/ 2010 49.6%
07/2010-06/ 2011 48.9%
fraction reporting being divorced or single. This pushed the family structure
of filers closer to the general population, and again suggests a rise in the num-
ber of middle-class filers during the recession. Table 3.23 indicates that the
rise in female filers was driven by more married couples filing and more single
women, with the share of single male filers declining.
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Table 3.22: Family Structure of Primary Filers
Period Cohabitation Rate Formerly Married Single Cohabitating if Kids
07/2007-06/ 2008 36.3 30.5 33.2 60.1
07/2008-06/ 2009 38.4 29.3 32.3 61.5
07/2009-06/ 2010 40.0 29.0 31.0 62.9
07/2010-06/ 2011 39.4 29.8 30.8 61.5
Table 3.23: Male Fraction
Fraction of Males
Period Cohabitation Formerly Married Single
07/2007-06/ 2008 53.8 43.7 56.2
07/2008-06/2009 52.4 42.9 55
07/2009-06/ 2010 52.2 41.8 53.1
07/2010-06/ 2011 52.0 40.1 52.0
Table 3.24: Family Status of Bankrupts in Canada
Year Married/Cohabitating Formerly Married Single
Bankrupts 1977 70 22 8
Pop 15-64 1976 64 6 30
Bankrupts: 1997 43 29 28
Pop 15-64: 1995 60 7 32
Source: Schwartz [1999].
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The family structure of filers in Canada has remained fairly constant since
1997. However, prior to that date there seemed to be more dramatic changes.
As Table 3.24 reports, married (including common law) couple’s share of bankrupt-
cies has fallen below their share of the Canadian population. Interestingly, the
number of filers without dependents has increased slightly, from 38 percent in
1977 to 46 percent in 1997, and to a relatively constant 52 percent during our
sample.
3.3.8 Filer Balance Sheet: Changes in the Composition of
Debts and Assets
Filers have lower net worth and fewer assets than the typical Canadian house-
hold. The median asset of a Canadian family unit (household) in 2004 was
$229,900), and the median debt was $44,500 (Survey of Financial Security
2005). While one expects filers to have negative net worth, Table 3.25 high-
lights the fact that filers also have much lower holdings of assets. In addition,
the debts of the median filer are lower than that of the median Canadian family
unit. This points towards the fact that many filers are both income and wealth
poor, and likely have lower long term income prospects than many Canadian
households.39 However, the higher mean debt reported in Table 3.25 implies
that population of filers also includes a number of households with income
prospects closer to that of middle-class Canadians.
39The correlation between debt and income is 0.33 in 2005 SFS.
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The average liabilities and non-financial assets of filers rose during the re-
cession, with most of the jumps coinciding with the rise in filings. Table 3.25
shows that this was driven by a subset of filers, as the median total liability
grew much less than the average liability. This was not the case for the un-
secured liabilities, which points to the role of homeowners in driving the rise
in mean filer debt. This is suggestive of middle-class filers becoming more
predominant in the pool of filers, because they have much higher assets and
income than the typical filer.
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Table 3.25: Filer Balance Sheet Characteristics
Total Liabilities Total Unsecured Lia-bilities Assets
Period Mean Median Std.
Dev.
Mean Median Std.
Dev.
Mean Median Std.
Dev.
07/2007-06/ 2008 66533 34747 85676 38571 28681 42071 33202 1978 75290
07/2008-06/ 2009 83636 39618 106511 42109 31449 43882 47193 3000 94114
07/2009-06/ 2010 92873 42782 115525 43835 32615 44718 55561 3701 104782
07/2010-06/ 2011 94790 43251 117917 44099 32730 44881 57798 3800 107346
Table 3.26: Filer Net Worth
Net Worth40 Net Worth to In-come
Period Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median
07/2007-06/ 2008 -33332 -25250 46133 -15.1467 -12.4844
07/2008-06/ 2009 -36443 -27446 47230 -15.5754 -12.9339
07/2009-06/ 2010 -37311 -28046 50117 -15.343 -12.7171
07/2010-06/ 2011 -36992 -27775 49229 -14.8118 -14.8118
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From Table 3.26, we see that the combined growth in assets and liabilities
led to a moderate rise in mean and median negative net worth. As Figure
3.17 illustrates, there was little trend over the recession in terms of the ratio
of net worth to income. However, total debt relative to income rose during
the recession. This suggests that the typical filer during the recession was
under even more financial “pressure” than they were prior to the recession. The
higher debt to income ratio is also consistent with a larger fraction of middle
class filers who had experienced a recession related income shock entering the
pool of filers.
Home Ownership
Home-ownership is a particularly interesting measure, as it is traditionally
associated with middle-class membership. Table 3.27 shows the dynamics of
the number of filers reporting home ownership or mortgage debt. Strikingly,
close to 65% of the rise in filings can be attributed to filers who own homes or
have mortgage debt. This is particularly striking given that the relatively few
filers before the recession were homeowners.
3.3.9 Student Loans
Unfortunately, data on the education of level of filers is not collected. Filers
do, however, report detailed data on the composition of their debt. We use
this data to compute the fraction of filers with at least $1,000 in student debt
by age cohort. As can be seen from Figure 3.18, the fraction of filers in their
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Figure 3.17: Filers: Net Worth to Income Ratio
Figure 3.18: Fraction of Filers with Student Loan Debt
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Table 3.27: Contribution from Home Ownership
Time Filers w. Home Ownership Total Contribution
Period or Mortgage Debt Filers (%)
07/2007-06/2008 14653 77122
07/2008-06/2009 23909 99621 41
07/2009-06/2010 28282 104748 49
07/2010-06/2011 25456 93760 65
thirties with student debt did rise during the recession. However, this change
was relatively small, as the fraction rose from just under 20% to just over 22%.
This suggests that there was not a large change in the fraction of filers with a
university degree during the recession.41
3.3.10 Changes in Filer Characteristics
We now examine how filer composition is related to provincial unemployment.
Using the fact that unemployment predicts insolvency, we test whether average
filer characteristics in each province vary with unemployment. In particular,
we consider:
Characteristic Growth Ratet,p = Trend+∆Unemp. Ratet,p+∆Unemp. Ratet−1,p+t,p.
41Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook [2000] document that many U.S. filers have some college
education, although university graduates are less likely than non-degree holders to file for
bankruptcy.
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Table 3.28 reports the regression results. Again, there are several indica-
tions that filers are becoming more “middle-class.” Specifically as unemploy-
ment rises, individuals are more likely to own a home, live with someone –
especially if they have kids. The initial filers are also more likely to be male
and then female, which suggests they may earn more income. One might expect
that proposals are more likely to be filed when higher unemployment results in
more “middle-class” families experiencing debt problems. However, we cannot
reject this story due to the impact of the September 2009 reforms that sought
to make proposals more attractive.
Table 3.29 show how assets and capacity for loan repayment changes with
unemployment. Although income does not change, total assets increase, the
net worth and net worth-to-income ratio rise, while total liabilities and total
unsecured liabilities rise. Overall, this supports the interpretation that the
rise in filings during the recession was driven by more middle class filers.
129
Table 3.28: Unemployment and Provincial Filer Characteristics: 2007Q1-2011Q2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age Cohabitation Cohabitation if kids Home Owner Proposal Fraction Male
Unemployment 0.00188 0.00991 * 0.0241 *** 0.0204 * -0.00332 0.00982 **
Rate Change (1.75) (2.50) (5.83) (2.20) (-0.20) (3.21)
Unemployment -0.000907 -0.00674 -0.000323 -0.0456 ** -0.00705 *
Rate Change (t-1) (-0.85) (-1.70) (-0.03) (-2.74) (-2.30)
Reform 0.194***
(4.20)
Constant 0.00371*** 0.00736 * 0.000382 0.0402 *** 0.0290 -0.00348
(3.83) (2.05) (0.10) (4.81) (1.80) (-1.26)
N 170 170 170 170 170 170
adj. R 2 0.019 0.063 0.163 0.020 0.124 0.110
Note: Dependent variables expressed as growth rates of means. Reform is an indicator for second half of
2009 to capture increased proposal limits. t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,*** p< 0.001
Table 3.29: Unemployment and Provincial Filer Characteristics: 2007Q1-2011Q2
Filer Income Total Assets Net Worth to Mean Net Worth Total Liabilities Total Uns.
Income Liabilities
Unemployment -0.0019 0.0207* 0.0158** 0.0143** 0.0173*** 0.0115***
Change (-0.79) (2.23) (2.78) (2.66) (3.47) (3.66)
Unemployment -0.0017 -0.0089 0.0123* 0.0110* 0.00139 0.00509
Change (t-1) (-0.72) (-0.96) (2.16) (2.05) (0.28) (1.62)
Constant 0.00830*** 0.0566*** -0.0018 0.00962* 0.0312*** 0.0120***
(3.91) (6.74) (-0.34) (1.98) (6.93) (4.23)
N 170 170 170 170 170 170
adj. R2 -0.007 0.035 0.042 0.038 0.06 0.064
Note: Dependent variables expressed as growth rates of means. t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,*** p< 0.001
130
We examine whether the debt-level of filers changed during the recession,
conditional on socio-demographic characteristics and current income and ex-
penses (which are correlated with average income prior to filing). We restrict
attention to individuals with housing assets of less $10,000 to help control for
any additional unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 3.30 shows filers appeared to have larger debt during and after the re-
cession. In particular, debt levels (conditional on filer characteristics) initially
increase and then decline. This suggests that filers were able to obtain more
debt prior to the recession, but faced tighter lending standards after aggregate
economic conditions deteriorated.
3.4 Conclusion
The 2008-09 recession witnessed an almost 50% jump in personal insolvency
filings in Canada. Our analysis suggests that while the sharp post-Lehman rise
in unemployment was a key factor, the tightening of lending standards were
also important. We also find that both of these channels play an important
role in accounting for cyclical fluctuations in insolvency filings during previous
business cycles.
Our analysis of the characteristics of filers documents significant changes
in the characteristics of filers over 2007-2011. In particular, both the fraction
of unemployed filers and the share of filers with “middle-class” characteristics
increased during the 2008-09 recession. While this provides supportive evi-
dence for the role of labour and credit market conditions in accounting for the
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Table 3.30: Debt Levels for Individuals with Less than $10,000 in Housing
Assets
(1) (2) (3)
Total Debt Unsecured Debt Secured Debt
p2 2035.1*** 1128.6*** 906.7***
(10.31) (6.48) (9.33)
p3 2421.2*** 1305.9*** 1120.4***
(12.37) (7.56) (11.62)
p4 1316.6*** 314.2 1007.2***
(6.55) (1.77) (10.18)
Age 1025.7*** 1402.5*** -378.4***
(35.15) (54.50) (-26.34)
Age Squared -9.766*** -12.47*** 2.724***
(-32.11) (-46.50) (18.19)
Male 5282.7*** 5350.9*** -77.76
(37.55) (43.12) (-1.12)
Cohabitating 1938.8*** 1895.7*** 43.26
(10.57) (11.72) (0.48)
Single Parent 976.6*** 1724.7*** -748.1***
(3.82) (7.66) (-5.95)
Kids 293.8** -459.0*** 756.2***
(3.21) (-5.69) (16.80)
Available -0.0437 0.122*** -0.164***
Family Inc (-1.28) (4.07) (-9.82)
Assets 0.942*** 0.0630*** 0.879***
(980.48) (74.36) (1857.84)
Housing 8.556*** 3.623*** 4.940***
Expense (46.67) (22.40) (54.72)
Insurance 22.33*** 27.70*** -5.328***
Expense (29.65) (41.72) (-14.37)
Medical 16.56*** 25.89*** -9.333***
Expense (10.97) (19.45) (-12.56)
Non Dis 10.81*** 11.69*** -0.976***
Expense (37.86) (46.45) (-6.94)
Provincial Yes Yes Yes
Controls
N 374963 374963 374963
adj. R 2 0.882 0.533 0.945
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,*** p < 0.001
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rise in insolvency, it also points to the need to better understand the distribu-
tion of household debt across households, and the vulnerability of households
to economic shocks. This suggests that further work is needed to better un-
derstand the underlying causes of cyclical movements in insolvencies and con-
sumer credit.
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Chapter 4
Aggregate Fluctuations,
Consumer Credit, and
Bankruptcies
4.1 Introduction
Despite a large and growing literature that examines how default possibilities
influence credit market outcomes and consumer welfare, little attention has
been paid to how cyclical fluctuations in bankruptcies interact with lenders’
credit granting decisions and households borrowing. This is surprising, as the
recent recession saw both a rapid rise in consumer bankruptcies, and broad
concern about the potential implications of high consumer debt levels for ag-
gregate consumption.
We address this gap in two ways. First, we document the historical cycli-
cal relationships between different measures of U.S. consumer credit market
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behavior – delinquencies, charge-offs, bankruptcies, interest rates – and con-
sumption. Second, we construct, and analyze a quantitative model of con-
sumer borrowing and bankruptcy where agents’ idiosyncratic income shocks
and financial intermediation costs are affected by aggregate shocks. We use
the model to decompose the driving forces behind cyclical fluctuations in the
consumer credit market and their impact on defaults. In particular, we seek to
identify the impact of changes in the composition of borrower risk on average
interest rate and borrowing.
Our empirical analysis documents that fluctuations in consumer bankrupt-
cies and charge-offs are large and counter-cyclical. Our proxy for the borrow-
ing interest faced by consumers, the average (real) credit card interest rate,
is counter-cyclical for 1973-2012 period, but exhibits a small positive corre-
lation with GDP since 1993. Importantly, unsecured consumer borrowing is
pro-cyclical, although measures such as revolving credit (primarily credit card
debt) exhibit countercylical fluctuations during the Great Moderation (1993-
2006).
Our quantitative approach extends a standard small-open economy incom-
plete market model with bankruptcy to incorporate aggregate shocks. This
framework allows for borrowing constraints to move endogenously with income
risk, and thus can potentially produce pro-cyclical debt without intermediation
137
shocks. However, for reasonable parameter values, we find that aggregate fluc-
tuations in income generates counter-cyclical debt despite matching the cycli-
cality of filings and consumption in the data. In addition to missing on the
cyclicality of debt, the benchmark model implies cyclical volatilities in filing,
interest rates and debt well below the data.
We find that introducing “intermediation shocks” – exogenous counter-cyclical
shocks to the cost of funds for lenders – moves the model predictions closer to
the data.1 One common explanation for increased costs to financial institutions
is increased scrutiny [Weinberg, 1995]. Recently, Corbae and DErasmo [2013]
documents that both consumer loan rates and markups are counter-cyclical.
Adding “intermediation shocks” to the model, generates pro-cyclical debt, and
the volatility of filings and interest rates rise closer to the data. This suggests
that counter-cyclical intermediation shocks may play an important role in con-
sumer credit markets.
The model is a heterogenous agent life-cycle model with incomplete mar-
kets, which builds upon Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt [2007].2 Each period,
households face idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding their income and expenses.
1Recently, Jermann and Quadrini [2012] argue that real and financial variables are affected
by “financial shocks,” which affect one’s ability to raise capital. They find these shocks to be
counter-cyclical.
2This environment builds on the competitive theory of equilibrium default pioneered by
Eaton and Gersovitz [1981] and adapted to analyze consumer bankruptcy by Chatterjee, Cor-
bae, Nakajima, and Rı´os-Rull [2007] and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt [2007].
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Aggregate shocks impact the probability of income shocks, as well as the risk-
free rate of interest. After the realization of the aggregate state (and the indi-
vidual shocks), households decide whether or not to file for bankruptcy, given
some bankruptcy rules. If bankruptcy is not declared, households can bor-
row (and save) via one-period non-contingent bonds with perfectly competitive
financial intermediaries. When making loans, financial intermediaries can ob-
serve each household’s earnings process, age, current asset holdings and aggre-
gate state. Therefore, in equilibrium, bond prices vary with income, age, total
borrowing of the debtor and aggregate state.
Closest in focus to our work are Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull [2005] and Gor-
don [2013]. Nakajima and Rı´os-Rull [2005] introduce aggregate fluctuations
into the Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rı´os-Rull [2007] framework. One
limitation of their approach is that they assume that all shocks are realized
(known) before households make borrowing decisions. As a result, all of ag-
gregate fluctuations are fully priced into the ex ante lending schedule faced by
borrowers. In contrast, under our timing, lenders set interest rates before the
aggregate state is realized. Our model predicts counter-cyclical fluctuations in
bankruptcy, whereas their literature predicts the opposite.3 Gordon [2013] also
extends the Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt [2007] to include aggregate shocks.
Unlike our paper, he focuses on how aggregate income risk impacts the welfare
gains from alternative bankruptcy regimes, whereas we focus on the extent to
3The handbook of macro (Chapter 2) summarizes work on the impact of contractionary
monetary shocks on consumer borrowing.
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which the model can match key cyclical patterns observed in the data.
Motivated by empirical studies on the cyclical variability of consumption
and the relationship between consumer borrowing and aggregate consumption,
several papers have sought to quantify the impact of exogenous shocks to bor-
rowing constraints.4 Ludvigson [1999] finds that introducing exogenous varia-
tions in borrowing constraints in a model with infinitely lived consumers helps
the model to more closely match cyclical fluctuations in aggregate consump-
tion. Krusell and Smith [1998] match the secular and cyclical properties of
U.S. consumption and borrowing using a model economy with a mix of patient
(standard) and impatient (borrowing constrained) households. Unlike Krusell
and Smith [1998], the model abstracts from capital accumulation, and there is
no trend growth in income.
There is empirical evidence that unsecured credit markets are impacted by
shocks to household incomes. Sullivan [2008] uses quarterly data from the
SIPP that tracks household unsecured borrowing from April 1996 to March
2000 (1996 Panel) and February 2001 to January 2004 (2001 Panel). He finds
that while the lowest income households (bottom decile of income), do not use
unsecured credit to smooth earnings loss, those in the second and third deciles
do – with a point estimate of 11.5 to 13.4 cents per dollar of earnings lost due
4Bacchetta and Gerlach [1997] use the degree of excess sensitivity of aggregate consumption
as a proxy for credit constraints. They examine data from the U.S., Canada, U.K., Japan and
France from 1970-1995 for consumption, disposable income and mortgage credit. Bacchetta
and Gerlach [1997] extend the excess sensitivity and liquidity constraints literature by explic-
itly adding credit variables (real mortgage credit and real consumer credit) and lending rate
spreads (borrowing/lending) to the regression analysis.
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to unemployment, while highest earning households run down savings in re-
sponse to unemployment.5 Using data provided by a major credit card lender,
Agarwal and Liu [2003] find that variations in county level unemployment
rates help account for delinquency rates on credit cards between January 1994
and December 2001.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We summarize back-
ground information on consumer bankruptcy in Section 2, and key cyclical
properties of consumer credit markets in Section 4.3. The basic environment
for evaluating the predictions of the standard model is presented in Section 4.4.
Section 5 presents our results, and the final section offers a brief conclusion.
4.2 Consumer Bankruptcy in the U.S.
American households can choose between two bankruptcy procedures: Chapter
7 and Chapter 13.6 Under Chapter 7, all unsecured debt is discharged in ex-
change for non-collateralized assets above an exemption level, and debtors are
not obliged to use future income to repay debts.7 Chapter 13 permits debtors
to keep their assets in exchange for a promise to repay part of their debt over
5Hurst and Stafford (2004) look at the use of home equity to smooth consumption for house-
holds with low levels of liquid assets. They find that this is used by households to smooth
consumption.
6See Mecham [2004] for a detailed description of consumer bankruptcy law in the United
States.
7The 2005 bankruptcy reform requires households with income above a threshold to enter
into a payment plan. (See White [2007] for details on the 2005 reforms.)
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the ensuing 3 to 5 years.8
Most bankrupts file under Chapter 7 (approximately 70 percent), which is
the focus of our paper. Debtors who file under Chapter 7 are not permitted to
refile under Chapter 7 for six years, although they may file under Chapter 13.
Filers must pay the bankruptcy court filing fee of $200 and fees for legal advice
that typically range from $750 to $1,500 (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
[2000]). In addition, a debtor filing for bankruptcy has to submit a detailed list
of all creditors, amounts owed, all assets, monthly living expenses as well as
the source and amount of income. A typical Chapter 7 bankruptcy takes about
4 months from start to completion.
Despite the dramatic secular increase in bankruptcy filings, the typical
bankrupt today is remarkably similar to the typical bankrupt of twenty years
ago (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook [2000], Warren [2002]). A typical bankrupt
is lower middle-class (with income roughly 30-50% lower than that of the av-
erage household), in their thirties with an extremely high debt-to-income ratio
and more unsecured debt, especially credit card debt, than the median house-
hold.
8Legal actions by creditors and most garnishments are halted upon filing for bankruptcy,
including phone calls and letters from creditors seeking repayment.
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4.3 Cyclical Patterns of Credit, Consumption and
Defaults
We examine annual data on consumer debt, consumption and bankruptcies
from 1973-2012.9 We detrend each series with a Hodrick and Prescott [1997]
filter, and report the relationships between the cyclical deviations from trend.
We set the smoothing parameter to 6.25 as argued to be appropriate for an-
nual data by Ravn and Uhlig [2002].10 We analyze logged data, so that de-
viation from trend approximate percentage differences. Given our interest in
bankruptcy, we focus on the unsecured consumer credit.
Table 4.3 reports the correlations between measures of credit market vari-
ables and consumption. Given the substantial rise in consumer debt since the
1970s, as well as the development and growth of products such as credit cards
and home equity lending, we compute correlations for the 1973-2012 period
as well as before (i.e., 1973-1992) the Great Moderation (which we identify as
1993 to 2006) and after (i.e., the Great Recession).
There are several key relationships worth noting. First, bankruptcy filings
are counter-cyclical (see Table 4.3 and the Figure 4.3). Cyclical fluctuations in
credit discharge rates are similar to bankruptcy filings, which is not surpris-
ing as the discharge of debt via bankruptcy filings accounts for a large share
9The data we use is reported in the Appendix in Table C.1.
10Using growth rates instead of filtering the data produces quantitatively similar results.
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of credit card discharges. As a proxy for the borrowing interest faced by con-
sumers, we use the average (real) on credit cards.11 While credit card rates are
counter-cyclical for the 1973-2012 period, they have a small positive correlation
with GDP since 1993.
Consumer debt tends to be procyclical, although some debt measures shifts
are countercyclical over 1993-2006. The narrowest measure of consumer credit
we examine is revolving credit, which primarily consists of outstanding credit
card balances. This is pro-cyclical, with the exception of the 1993-2006 period
when it is counter-cyclical. A practical question – which also arises in map-
ping the model to the data – is how to account for charge-offs when measuring
the cyclicality of debt. When we adjust the stock of revolving credit using the
credit card charge-off rate over 1985-2012, we find that the correlation between
revolving credit and GDP changes from -0.05 to -0.34.12
We consider several other proxies for unsecured consumer credit. The Fed-
eral Reserve Consumer Credit Report (G.19 Release) includes both revolving
and non-revolving credit, where the later includes auto loans as well as con-
sumer installment loans. This debt measure is procyclical, with the exception
of the “great moderation.” One concern is that this shift in cyclical patterns may
reflect the growth of home equity lines of credit, which has become a substitute
for traditional consumer lending. This leads us to add home equity lending
(which is available since 1990) to consumer credit. The correlation of this debt
11The rate is the unweighed average credit card rate on all balances less inflation.
12The published charge-off series we use begins in 1985.
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Table 4.1: Correlations with GDP1
73-92 93-06 07-12 73-12
Filings/HH -0.61 -0.442 -0.90 -0.46
Charge-Offs3 -0.91 -0.55 -0.87 -0.74
Consumption 0.89 0.88 0.98 0.91
Consumer Credit 0.82 -0.20 0.42 0.63
Revolving Credit 0.64 -0.24 -0.03 0.51
Consumer Debt + Home Equity Loans 0.68 -0.09 0.96 0.62
Cons. Credit/Disposable Income 0.68 -0.33 0.06 0.43
Credit Card Interest Rates -0.72 0.06 0.15 -0.59
Disposable Income 0.84 0.52 0.97 0.81
Notes. 1. Annual data detrended with an HP-filter. 2. Excludes 05 and 06. 85 Onwards.
measure with GDP declines to -0.09 from -0.20 over 1993-2006, and becomes
more strongly procyclical for the 2007-12 period..
Since the carrying cost of consumer debt needs to be evaluated relative to
disposable income, we consider whether normalizing consumer credit by dis-
posable income changes the cylicality. However, this has a relatively small
impact on the correlations.
We also examine quarterly correlations. Specifically, we compute the cor-
relations between GDP along with it’s leads and lags. Overall, we see similar
patterns as in Table 4.3. However, lagged consumer credit is weakly counter-
cyclical while the lead of consumer debt to income is pro-cyclical. Real credit
card interest rates counter-cyclically lead GDP.
Table 4.3 displays the volatilities of the credit market variables, debt and
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Table 4.2: Quarterly Correlations with GDP
Y(-2) Y(0) Y(2)
Filings/HH -0.44 -0.45 -0.25
Charge Offs -0.65 -0.74 -0.57
Real Consumption 0.74 0.92 0.71
Consumer Credit -0.42 0.17 -0.04
Revolving Consumer Credit 0.39 0.02 -0.29
Debt/Inc 0.14 -0.07 -0.14
Real Credit Card Interest Rates 0.10 -0.08 -0.36
Table 4.3: Volatility Relative to GDP: σ
σy
1
73-92 93-06 07-12 73-12
Filings/HH 5.9 11.92 8.5 11.7
Charge-Offs3 9.9 16.9 17.2 15.6
Consumption 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Consumer Debt 2.6 2.9 1.8 2.5
Revolving Credit 6.4 3.2 2.1 5.6
Consumer Debt + Home Equity Loans 2.6 2.2 1.3 2.6
Consumer Credit/Disposable Income 2.2 3.1 1.7 2.2
Credit Card Interest Rates 12.5 7.0 5.2 11.1
Disposable Income 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2
Notes. 1. Annual data detrended with an HP-filter. 2. Excludes 05 and 06. 85 Onwards.
consumption relative to GDP. As Figure 4.3 immediately shows, filings are ex-
tremely volatile as they differ by more than a factor of 10. Similarly, charge-
offs and real credit card interest rates are very volatile relative to GDP. For the
most part, there are no trends in volatility. The exceptions are debt and real
credit card interest rates, which appears to have become less volatile over time.
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Figure 4.1: GDP and Insolvency Filings
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Figure 4.2: GDP and Total Consumer Credit
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4.4 Environment
In this section, we outline the model, and describe our benchmark parametriza-
tion which serves as a starting point for the numerical experiments.
4.4.1 The Model
We extend the “Fresh Start” model of consumer bankruptcy of Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt [2007] by incorporating an earning process and lending cost (inter-
est rate) which vary with the aggregate state. These extensions allow us to
evaluate the contributions of these two aggregate risk channels to cyclical fluc-
tuations in unsecured consumer borrowing and bankruptcies.
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of J-period
lived households. Each generation is comprised of measure 1 of households
facing idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty. Markets are incomplete, with
agents borrowing using non-contingent person-specific one-period bonds and
saving at an exogenously given interest rate.13 Households have the option to
declare bankruptcy.
13As this paper focuses on the market for unsecured debt (which comprises a small fraction
of total borrowing in the United States), significant feedback effects on the aggregate risk-
free interest rate seem unlikely. Given the significant computational burden associated with
closing the model, we assume that the aggregate capital market takes the form of a small open
economy.
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Households
Households maximize expected discounted life-time utility from consumption:
E
J∑
j=1
βj−1u
(
cj
nj
)
, (4.1)
where β is the discount factor, cj is household consumption and nj is the size of
a household of age j in equivalence scale units.
The labor income of a household i of age j is the product of an age-dependent
labor endowment and productivity shocks:
yij = ejz
i
jη
i
j, (4.2)
where ej is the deterministic endowment of efficiency units of labor, zij is a
persistent shock to the household’s earnings, and ηij a transitory shock.
The probabilities of the persistent income shocks vary with the realization
of the aggregate state ω. The aggregate shock impacts the distribution of id-
iosyncratic shocks in the current period, and thus, shifts the riskiness of income
the following period when the aggregate state is persistent.
Besides the persistent and transitory income shocks, households face an-
other form of idiosyncratic uncertainty: they are subject to possible expense
shocks κ ≥ 0. An expense shock directly changes the net asset position of a
household. Expense shocks are independently and identically distributed, and
are independent of income shocks (and hence do not vary with the aggregate
shocks). We assume that the set of possible expense shocks K is finite. The
probability of shock κi is denoted by pii.
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A household can file for bankruptcy. As in Chapter 7, upon filing all debts
are discharged, and the household enters the following period with a balance
of zero (unless hit by an expense shock that period).14 Filers also face several
types of “punishment” which proxy for specific features of Chapter 7. First,
bankruptcy cannot be declared two periods in a row. Second, to capture the
requirement that borrowers make a good faith effort to repay their debt, we
force bankrupt households to repay a fraction γ of their earnings during the
period in which they file.15 Since we lack a direct measure of these implicit
constraints on bankruptcy, we calibrate this bankruptcy cost parameter so as
to match the debt facts.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, each household
realizes its productivity and expense shocks. If the household receives an ex-
pense shock, then the debt of the household is increased (or savings decreased)
by the amount of the shock. The household then decides whether to file for
bankruptcy or not. If bankruptcy is declared, creditors garnish labor income
14This means that bankrupts cannot save or borrow during the default period because all
assets are seized during a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Given our period length of three years, one
might wonder if the restriction to not allow savings constitutes a significant punishment. It
turns out that the no-savings constraint is binding only for a very small fraction of households
and that results do not change significantly when this assumption is relaxed.
15The U.S. bankruptcy code specifies that borrowers must act in “good faith”, so that someone
who borrows and immediately files for bankruptcy risks having their petition denied. Prior to
1984, courts had the implicit right to dismiss a case based on “bad faith” behavior by the debtor.
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship act of 1984 and the 1986 amendments to
section 707(b) of the Code formalized this by explicitly allowing bankruptcy trustees to make a
motion for dismissal for substantial abuse. While the interpretation of “substantial abuse” has
varied across courts, the ability to repay a significant fraction of one’s debt has often played
a large role in courts’ decisions to dismiss debtors’ bankruptcy petitions (see Cain [1997] and
Wells, Kurtz, and Calhoun [1991]).
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and the consumer is allowed to spend the remaining income. Filers are not
allowed to save or borrow, thus, they consume all earnings net of debt-recovery
γ (and “burning”). Households who do not declare bankruptcy decide on their
asset holdings for the following period and their current consumption.
Financial Intermediaries
Financial markets are perfectly competitive. Intermediaries accept deposits
from savers and make loans to borrowers. The risk-free savings rate rs(ω) is
given exogenously, and varies with the aggregate state. Loans take the form
of one period non-contingent bond contracts. However, the bankruptcy option
introduces a partial contingency by allowing filers to discharge their debts.
The face value of a loan to be repaid next period is denoted by d′. Savings
are denoted by d′ < 0. Intermediaries incur a proportional transaction cost of
making loans, τ .
Intermediaries have complete information about borrowers: They observe
the total level of borrowing d′, the current persistent productivity shock z, the
aggregate state ω and the borrower’s age j.16 This allows intermediaries to
accurately forecast the default probability of a borrower, θ(d′, z, ω, j), and price
the loan accordingly.
16The realizations of the transitory shock η and the expense shock κ do not contain any
additional information on the default risk.
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Equilibrium
In equilibrium, perfect competition and complete information imply that in-
termediaries make zero expected profit on each loan and that cross subsi-
dization of interest rates across different types of borrowers does not occur.
Therefore the individual bond price is determined by the default probabil-
ity of the issuer and the risk-free bond price. Without debt-recovery, with-
out usury law and with full discharge of debt, the zero profit condition is
qb(d′, z, j, ω) = (1−θ(d′, z, ω, j))qb(ω), where qb
(
= 1
1+rs(ω)+τ
)
is the price of a bond
with zero default probability.
For positive levels of debt-recovery, this formula needs to be adjusted. The
unrestricted bond price under debt recovery is
qub(d′, z, ω, j) = (1− θ(d′, z, ω, j))qb(ω) + θ(d′, z, ω, j))E
(
γy
d′ + κ′
)
qb(ω) (4.3)
where E
(
γy
d′+κ′
)
is the expected rate of recovery, assuming that when a house-
hold defaults, the amount recovered is allocated proportionately to expense
debt and personal loans.
Lastly, taking into account the interest rate ceiling r¯, the equilibrium bond
price is
qb(d′, z, ω, j) =
 q
ub(d′, z, ω, j) if qub(d′, z, ω, j)) > 1
1+r¯
0 otherwise
(4.4)
Households take the bond price schedule as given when making decisions.
The problem of a household is defined recursively using three distinct value
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functions. V is the value of a “normal period,” while V¯ is the value of declaring
bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy cannot be declared two periods in a row,
households have the option to default when they are ineligible for bankruptcy.17
If a household chooses this option, they face the same proportional costs as
if they were able to file for bankruptcy. However, unlike in bankruptcy, no
debt is discharged. Given that households in default no longer are borrowing
from the market, we assume their debt is rolled over at a fixed interest rate
rr. Note that the only debt such a household holds is debt arising from an
expense shock. After the forced repayments and applying interest rate rr, next
period’s debt for this case is equal to (κ−γe¯jzη)(1+rr). The value function for a
household defaulting in the period following bankruptcy is denoted by W . The
value functions are given by:
Vj(d, z, ω, η, κ) = max
c,d′
[
u
(
c
nj
)
+ βEmax
{
Vj+1(d
′, z′, ω′, η′, κ′), V¯j+1(z′, ω′, η′)
}]
s.t. c+ d+ κ 6 e¯jzη + qb(d′, z, ω, j)d′
(4.5)
V¯j(z, ω, η) = u
(
c
nj
)
+ βEmax {Vj+1(0, z′, ω′, η′, κ′),Wj+1(z′, ω′, η′, κ′)}
s.t. c = (1− λ)(1− γ)(e¯jzη − φ)
(4.6)
17We need to introduce this option to deal with the possibility that a household may not
be able to repay the realized value of an expense shock in the period immediately following
bankruptcy. In practice, this is not of much importance in the model since this situation rarely
arises.
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Wj(z, ω, η, κ) = u
(
c
nj
)
+ βEmax
{
Vj+1(d
′, z′, ω′, η′, κ′), V¯j+1(z′, ω′, η′)
}
s.t. c = (1− λ)(1− γ)e¯jzη, d′ = (κ− γe¯jzη)(1 + rr)
(4.7)
An equilibrium is a set of value functions, optimal decision rules for the
consumer, default probabilities, and bond prices, such that equations (4.5)-(4.7)
are satisfied, and the bond prices are determined by the zero profit condition,
taking the default probabilities as given. The model can be solved numerically
by backwards induction.
4.4.2 Benchmark Calibration
Our approach is to choose parameters to match the US economy during the
nineties, and then modify the income process and interest rates to match cycli-
cal movements. Our discussion of how we choose long-run parameters is brief
since we largely follow Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt [2010].
Long-Run Averages
The non-cyclical parameterization consists of household and financial parame-
ters. We summarize this parameterization in Table 4.4.
Household Parameters Households are born into the economy at age 20
and die at age 74. During the first 45 periods (ages 20-65) households receive
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Table 4.4: Non-Cyclical Parameterization
Parameter Target/Source
Periods (J) 45 Working Years + Retirement
Utility 1
1−σ [c
1−σ − 1]
Risk-aversion (σ) 2
Savings interest rate Municipal Bonds
Age-profile of Earnings Gourinchas and Parker ’02
AR(1) Income Process Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron ’04
Expense Shocks (η) Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt ’07
Medical bills (MEPS 1996-97)
Divorce (US Vital Stats, Equiv. Scale)
Unwanted children (US Vital Stats, USDA)
Discount Factor (β) 0.83% Chapter 7 filings
Transaction cost (τ ) 12.4% Average borrowing int. rate
Garnishment (γ) 9% Unsecured Debt/Income ratio
4.8% Charge-off Rate
a stochastic endowment, while the final period corresponds to a nine year re-
tirement in which households do not face any uncertainty. The period utility
function is u(c) = c1−σ−1
1−σ . We set the annual discount factor equal to 0.92 and the
degree of risk aversion σ equal to 2.18 Household size measured in equivalence
units is taken from Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt [2007].
The expense shocks are calibrated using data on expenses that are both un-
expected and frequently cited by bankrupts as the cause of their bankruptcy.
We consider three different sources of shocks: medical bills, divorces, and un-
planned pregnancies. In our experiments, the expense shocks can take on three
values: κ ∈ {0, κ1, κ2}. To calibrate the medical expense shock, we use data from
18We have also investigated somewhat higher and lower degrees of risk aversion (σ = 1.5
and 2.5) and found that our results are robust to this modification.
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the 1996 and 1997 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and from the US
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). MEPS provides detailed data
on out-of-pocket medical expenses in 1996 and 1997 for a random sample of
7,435 households. We combine our estimate of these medical expenses with
estimates of the cost of divorces and of an unplanned or unwanted child. Our
calculations generate one shock that is 26.4 percent of (one model period) aver-
age income in the economy. The other shock is equal to 82.18 average income in
the economy. The probabilities of being hit by these shocks are 7.1 percent and
0.46 percent, respectively (newly born and retired households are not subject
to expense shocks).
The life-cycle profile of labor income is based on Gourinchas and Parker
(2002). To incorporate aggregate fluctuations in the stochastic income process
we modify an AR(1) income process used to calibrate the steady-state model.
A large literature has estimated the volatility of log earnings using the follow-
ing structure: log yi = zi + ηi + g(X i), where g(X) captures the deterministic
component of earnings, and z and η ∼ N(0, σ2η) are respectively persistent and
transitory random components. The log of the persistent idiosyncratic shock
follows an AR(1) process, zij = ρzij−1 + ij, where ij ∼ N(0, σ2 ). We set the bench-
mark value of ρ = 0.95, σ2 = 0.025 and σ2η = 0.05. These values are within
the range of values reported by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron [2004], Hub-
bard, Skinner, and Zeldes [1994], and Carroll and Samwick [1997]. To feed
these values into our model for the steady-state calibration, we discretize the
156
idiosyncratic income shocks using the Tauchen method outlined in Adda and
Cooper [2003]. The persistent shock is discretized as a five state Markov pro-
cess, and the initial realizations for newly-born households are drawn from the
stationary distribution. When discretizing the transitory shock, we assume
that 10% of the population receives a positive (negative) transitory shock each
period, and choose the value of the support to match the variance.
We assume that the (exogenous) income of a retired household is the sum of
two parts: an autonomous income of 20% of average earnings in the economy
and an additional income of 35% of their own persistent earnings realization
in the period before retirement. This leads to a progressive retirement income
system with an average replacement rate of 55%, which is within the range of
numbers reported in Butrica, Iams, and Smith [2004]. Note that total retire-
ment income is higher as households also have private savings.
Financial Market Parameters The savings interest rate is set equal to
3.44%, as in Gourinchas and Parker [2002]. The rollover interest rate rr is set
to 20% annual. The three remaining parameters — the debt recovery rate γ,
transaction cost τ , and the interest rate ceiling r¯ — are chosen to match the
facts from Table 4.4. This leads to a transactions cost of making loans of 3.50%
annually. Together with the risk-free savings rate of 3.44%, the annual risk-
free lending rate is 5.94%. The interest rate ceiling is set to a (high) value of
75% annually.19
19As discussed in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt [2010], the failure to impose an interest rate
ceiling leads to artificially high average interest rates.
157
The γ implied by this calibration is 0.5. It is worth emphasizing that this pa-
rameter captures many features of the default option introduced by bankruptcy,
and that we do not interpret γ as mapping directly into what is recovered by
lenders after a borrower has defaulted. Instead, this is intended to capture the
fact that borrowers typically make a sequence of payments on unsecured debt
before defaulting. As discussed in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt [2010], there
is no direct empirical counter to determine if our parameter is too high (or low).
4.4.3 Cyclical Income Process
To incorporate aggregate fluctuations in the income process, we keep the in-
come support fixed from the steady state calibration, and vary the persistent
transition matrix with the aggregate state. We choose to model the aggregate
shock process as a two state process, where the economy spends roughly 75%
of the time in expansions and the probability of remaining in a recession (“bad”
aggregate state) is one-third. Then, the transition probabilities (good,bad) in
the good state are [7/9, 2/9], and [2/3, 1/3] in the bad state.
We choose two transition matrices which imply that aggregate income falls
by 3% during bad times, and rise by 1% during expansions, relative to the
steady-state income process. We pick a single parameter which increases the
probability of receiving a lower-level income level compared to the transition
matrix from Section 4.4.2. Specifically, we use the λ such that a transition
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matrix 
(
1−λ∑5j=2 z1,j∑5
j=2 z1,j
)z1,1 λz1,2 λz1,3 · · · λz1,5
(
1−λ∑5j=2 z2,j∑5
j=2 z2,j
)z2,1 λz2,2 λz2,3 · · · λz2,5
(
1−λ∑5j=3 z3,j∑5
j=3 z3,j
)z3,1 (
1−λ∑5j=3 z3,j∑5
j=3 z3,j
)z3,2 λz3,3 · · · λz3,5
...
...
...
...
...
(1−λz5,5
z5,5
)z5,1 (
1−λz5,5
z5,5
)z5,2 · · · (1−λz5,5z5,5 )z5,4 λz5,5

matches the change in the aggregate level relative to steady state distribution.
The initial realizations for newly born households are drawn from the sta-
tionary distribution. During a recession, individuals receive less income at the
beginning of their life. We choose λ′ such that the first-period distribution is
such that
D = [
1
5
+
λ′
5
,
1
5
− λ
′
52
, . . . ,
1
5
− λ
′
52
,
1
5
− 2λ
′
52
]
there is a 3% drop in income during the first-period of their life and a 1% in-
crease during expansions.
4.4.4 Quantitative Experiments
We use the calibrated model to assess the importance of the two aspects of
aggregate shocks — changes in distribution of income shocks, and shocks to
financial intermediation — for the cyclical behaviour of consumer debt and
bankruptcies; and to assess whether the standard model is capable of repli-
cating the stylized facts. Table 4.5 reports the results from our quantitative
experiments.
159
In our first experiment, we model the aggregate state as affecting only the
income process, and not the cost of funds. We find that changes in income
shocks alone cannot generate the volatilities we see in the data and miss the
cyclicality of consumer debt. Introducing intermediation shocks in the second
experiment helps address both of this shortcoming, at least qualitatively. The
model still struggles to match the volatilities observed in the data.
Experiment 1 - Income Shocks
We first analyze the quantitative impact of income shocks in our benchmark
economy. While our benchmark replicates several key empirical observations,
income shocks alone fail to generate filing and consumption cyclicality observed
in the data. The implied volatility of bankruptcies (and thus, interest rates) are
also well below those observed in the data.
A further issue is that aggregate income risk leads to countercyclical – not
procyclical – debt. In response to a rise in transitory (negative) income shocks,
households increase their borrowing to smooth consumption. This leads to a
rise in aggregate debt in during “recessions” in the model, driven primarily by
an extensive margin, as more households borrow as a result of negative income
shocks.
Why does this environment fail to generate large cyclical swings in bankruptcy
filings? A key factor is that over the cycle is that borrowing constraints do
not really tighten during the recession in this model. In Figure 4.3, we plot
160
Table 4.5: Experiments
Constant Counter-
Data Interest Cyclical Int
Series σ ρ(·, Y ) σ ρ(·, Y ) σ ρ(·, Y )
GDP 1.98 1 1.87 1 1.78 1
Consumption 1.78 0.87 1.16 0.99 1.55 0.78
Filings 19.2 -0.40 0.77 -0.69 1.58 -0.55
Debt 11.5 0.58 1.4 -0.52 1.53 0.29
Avg. int. rate 22.96 -0.31 0.013 -0.96 13.63 -0.43
the bond prices during a recession or an expansion for a middle-income of the
youngest age cohort. As one can see, the debt level where borrowers are likely
to default does not change. If lenders perceived enough increased risk to mak-
ing a loan, they would endogenously tighten their borrowing constraints which
would trigger more defaults.
Experiment 2 - Income Shocks + Intermediation Shocks
In an attempt to reconcile the standard model with the empirical observations,
we introduce intermediation shocks. In the second experiment, we vary the
risk-free cost of saving between 2% and 6% with aggregate state. This variation
in the cost of borrowing is not calibrated to any particular fact in the data,
but simply intended to represent a large change in financial system during
recessions which will drive up the cost of borrowing.
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Figure 4.3: Bond Prices: Expansion vs. Recession
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We show the results in the last column of Table 4.5. The increased borrow-
ing costs makes it more difficult to borrow during recessions, as a result there
are more defaults. This type of shock reduces the gap between the model and
the data. Indeed, intermediation shocks can generate pro-cyclical borrowing. It
also increases the volatility of both filings and interest rates, albeit somewhat
mechanically.
These experiments demonstrate the potential importance of the lending
market during recession for consumers. However, the benchmark model still
understates the volatility of bankruptcy filings.
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Summary
A standard quantitative model modified to include a cyclical income process
generates filing and consumption cyclicality consistent with the data. However,
this simple model cannot generate pro-cyclicality of consumer debt observed in
the data. The model also dramatically understates the cyclical volatility of fil-
ings and interest rates. The basic reason for both these failures is that most
households in the model are able to weather mild income shocks induced by a
recession by borrowing to smooth consumption over time. Thus, recessions in
such a model are accompanied by an increase in debt and only very mild in-
crease in bankruptcy filings. And since bankruptcy rates in the model are very
stable, so are the interest rates, as can be seen in Figure 4.3. One way of think-
ing about this failure of the model is that the endogenous lending standards in
the model do not respond enough to the aggregate shocks.
Introducing financial intermediation shocks (exogenously increasing the cost
of funds during recessions) enables the basic model to reproduce pro-cyclicality
of consumer debt observed in the data. Mechanically, increasing the cost of
borrowing during recessions limits ability of households to smooth their id-
iosyncratic shocks over time, and leads to both fall in debt and an increase
in bankruptcy filings in a recession. Furthermore, this exogenous mechanism
directly affect variability of interest rates. Yet, even with the exogenous finan-
cial intermediation shocks, the model struggles to generate large volatility of
bankruptcy filings.
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4.5 Conclusion and Future Work
We document the historical cyclical behaviour of several key characteristics
of the consumer credit market. We find that unsecured debt is (mostly) pro-
cyclical, while delinquencies, charge-offs, bankruptcies, and average interest
rates are counter-cyclical and very volatile. We construct and analyze a quan-
titative model of consumer borrowing and bankruptcy, where agents face id-
iosyncratic income and expense shocks and the economy is subject aggregate
income distribution and financial intermediation shocks, to explain the facts.
We calibrate the model and compare its predictions to the data. We use the
model to decompose the driving forces behind cyclical fluctuations in the con-
sumer credit market and their impact on defaults. The most standard model
(without intermediation shocks) misses the data in two key dimensions. First,
our quantitative experiments reveal that the standard model generates counter-
cyclical debt despite matching the cyclicality of filings and consumption in the
data. Second, the standard model fails to generate the large cyclical volatilities
of filings and interest rates observed in the data.
The model’s ability to match the data is greatly improved by introducing
“intermediation shocks.” Jermann and Quadrini [2012] argue that real and fi-
nancial variables are affected by “financial shocks,” which affect ones ability to
raise capital. Jermann and Quadrini [2012] find these shocks to be counter-
cyclical. To match this, we exogenously vary the cost of funds borrowers face.
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Incorporating these intermediation shocks into the benchmark model gener-
ates pro-cyclical debt. Furthermore, the cyclical volatilities of filings and in-
terest rates become closer to the data. Thus, we argue that counter-cyclical
intermediation shocks may play an important role in consumer credit mark-
ers.
This work highlights a key challenge for future research. First, the model
with intermediation shocks still struggles to reproduce the volatility of filings.
The quantitative model studied in this chapter suggests that cyclical variation
in idiosyncratic income shocks cannot generate large volatility of bankruptcy
filings, not even when combined with intermediation shocks. But this is incon-
sistent with the empirical findings of the previous chapter, which documents
that unemployment rates are very important to explaining bankruptcy rates.
Reconciling these findings is an important avenue for future research.
Our data analysis also uncovers a period where the cyclicality of debt switches.
While credit is mostly pro-cyclical, this pattern does not hold in the 1990s. It is
possible that the secular changes in the consumer credit market, which lead to
the dramatic rise in personal bankruptcies and consumer credit, explain this
phenomenon. Further research is needed to establish whether the cyclicality
of debt could have switched during transition to the new steady state.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
My dissertation consists of three chapters in macroeconomics. Chapter 2 ex-
amines the role of cross-sector complementarities in driving the observed pat-
terns of innovation activity in the United States economy. Chapters 3 and 4
study consumer credit, and in particular, bankruptcy. Chapter 3 is an empiri-
cal paper examining the drivers of bankruptcy filings using Canadian data. In
chapter 4 a quantitative macroeconomic model explains consumers’ decisions
to declare bankruptcy and how this is impacted in a recession. The model is
then calibrated to fit the observed patterns of bankruptcies in United States.
Each chapter documents new empirical facts. Chapters 2 and 4 also provide
new economic models to try to explain these new findings.
In Chapter 2, I propose that innovation is related between industries due to
the production structure. When the quality of available ideas improves in one
industry, the output of that industry will increase, which leads to increased
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demand in the complementary industry. This increases the returns from in-
venting in the second industry, and results in their inventors developing ideas
below the prior quality threshold. I develop a multi-industry innovation model
to capture this mechanism. I also provide evidence that the inter-industry re-
lationship strengthens with a measure of complementarities between any two
industries.
These findings suggest that production complementarities between indus-
tries are an important determinant of innovation, which had not been previ-
ously considered. They also contribute to the current debate on U.S. patent
policy, where there is a growing belief among scholars and practitioners that
the quality of patents has declined during their recent surge in number. This
viewpoint largely attributes the surge in patents to their increased value in
deterring competition. It is well-documented that the rate of patenting has in-
creased in most industries [Kortum and Lerner, 1999]. This observation is con-
sistent with an explanation involving changes in the patent system. However, I
instead use the model to demonstrate that such a decline could be explained by
increased innovative opportunities in certain industries and the corresponding
response of complementary industries.
The other two chapters explore the forces affecting consumer bankruptcies
during recessions. The chapters on consumer credit highlight a key challenge
for future research. In Chapter 4, the quantitative model’s ability to match the
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data is greatly improved by introducing “intermediation shocks.” Neverthe-
less, it struggles to reproduce the volatility of filings observed in U.S. data. The
implication is that the cyclical variation in idiosyncratic income shocks cannot
generate large enough volatility of bankruptcy filings, not even when combined
with intermediation shocks. But this is inconsistent with the empirical find-
ings of the previous chapter, which documents that unemployment rates are
very important to explaining bankruptcy rates in Canada. Reconciling these
findings is an important avenue for future research.
5.1 Bibliography
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Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Cutoff Derivation
The final good sector is perfectly competitive, thus:
Ri = 0.5X
− 1

i (0.5X
1− 1

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1− 1

2 )
1
−1 .
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Dividing (A.1) for i = 1 and i = 2,
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Notice that
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider the weighted quality of each industry:
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A.3 Special Cases
Example 2. Perfect Complements
When  = 0, aggregate quality is invariant to idea distributions. To see this,
I consider how aggregate quality changes by decomposing it into the contribu-
tion from each industry. Notice, a Leontif production function implies that the
weighted quality of industry i equals
QiNi
Ni +Nj
=
QiNi
Ni +
QiNi
Qj
=
1
1
Qi
+ 1
Qj
.
Then average aggregate quality is
Q =
2
1
Qi
+ 1
Qj
.
Now, the distributional assumptions provide a stark implication. Since the
average quality in each industry is proportional to marginal cost,
1
1
Qi
+ 1
Qj
=
k
k − 1
(
1
1
φ∗i
+ 1
φ∗j
)
=
k
k − 1 .
But
1
1
φ∗i
+ 1
φ∗j
= 1,
because the marginal benefit must equal the marginal cost. Therefore average
aggregate quality is invariant to the idea distributions.
The intuition is that, any change in project quality for a industry is exactly
offset by its weight among projects. Thus the industry with worse ideas must
produce more of them, because of complementarities.
Example 3. Perfect Substitutes
When  = +∞, aggregate quality is also invariant to idea distributions. In
this case, each marginal project must be able to produce a unit of the final good.
Thus
1
φ∗i
=
1
2
.
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This implies that the average quality for each industry is identical:
Qi =
2k
k − 1 .
Conversely to Example 2, in this case the industry with better ideas imple-
ments more of them.
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A.4 Patent Number and Quality by Industry
Table A.1: Patent Number and Quality by Industry
Industry Total Patents Ave. Cites R&D/Sales Name
13 8048 12.2 1.9% Oil And Gas Extraction
20 5344 10.5 0.6% Food And Kindred Products
22 1526 11.4 0.6% Textile Mill Products
23 403 10.1 0.4% Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Mat.
24 1170 6.8 0.7% Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture
25 2234 7.8 1.2% Furniture And Fixtures
26 13580 12.2 4.4% Paper And Allied Products
27 1140 9.5 0.1% Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries
28 88758 9.6 4.4% Chemicals And Allied Products
29 25304 8.1 0.6% Petroleum Refining And Related Industries
30 7271 8.2 2.4% Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products
31 325 12.1 0.1% Leather And Leather Products
32 3973 8.2 1.2% Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products
33 8046 8.8 1.4% Primary Metal Industries
34 7836 11.9 1.3% Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Trans. Equipment
35 65274 9.4 4.6% Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment
36 73988 10.3 4.8% Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Comp. Equip.
37 58091 10.0 3.8% Transportation Equipment
38 44023 10.9 5.5% Instrument and Related Products
39 2495 8.8 2.1% Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
48 14311 21.0 2.9% Communications
49 959 12.8 0.0% Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services
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A.5 Other Types of Patents
The NBER database includes all (and only) utility patents. In addition to util-
ity patents, there Design, Reissue, and Plant patents. Hall et al. [2001] finds
that utility patents accounts for 90% of all patents. Utility patents are granted
only if the invention provides an identifiable benefit and that is capable of use.
Design patents are issued for a new, original, and ornamental design embodied
in or applied to an article of manufacture. Plant patents are issued for a new
and distinct, invented or discovered asexually reproduced plant including cul-
tivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber
propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state. Reissue Patent are
issued to correct an error in an already issued utility, design, or plant patent.
A.6 Bibliography
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Appendix B
Chapter 3 Appendix
B.1 Income Imputation
We impute income average-tax family income from the SFS. To make the data
comparable, we restrict the SFS sample to individuals who do not run a busi-
ness. We then regress average family income on balance sheet, socio-demographic,
expenses and provincial dummies for four different age cohorts (25-34,35-44,45-
54,55-65). The results are presented in Table B.1.
To generate the results in Section , we take the following steps:
1. Calculate mean for variables in Table B.1 in 2004 $.
2. Impute average family income for the population of filers based the means
from the above model.
3. Adjust imputed income for real (annual) income growth for the relevant
age group.
As a check of shifts in the distribution of projected filer income, we compare
the ratio of mean versus median income. As can be seen from Table B.2, this
ratio is quite consistent over the recession.
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Table B.1: After-Tax Family Income Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Income Income Income
Non-Financial Net Worth 0.103 0.144∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0963∗∗∗
(0.0677) (0.0460) (0.0303) (0.0267)
Property Value 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.00676∗∗ 0.0511∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.00235) (0.00733) (0.00611)
No Property 1236.7 −7781.0∗ −10857.9∗∗∗ −6784.8∗
(3181.9) (3636.0) (3144.7) (2983.7)
Vehicle Value 0.500∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗
(0.0874) (0.103) (0.0722) (0.0696)
Mortgage Debt 0.0784 0.201∗∗∗ 0.0612 0.0922∗
(0.0700) (0.0482) (0.0406) (0.0398)
Non-Mortgage Debt 0.132 0.169∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.0763) (0.0717) (0.0488) (0.0555)
Housing Expenses 0.742∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗ 1.286∗∗∗ 0.487∗
(0.217) (0.210) (0.210) (0.207)
Cohabitation 12705.0∗∗∗ 15395.2∗∗∗ 20953.0∗∗∗ 17066.5∗∗∗
(2089.4) (3126.3) (2491.0) (2630.8)
Male 5416.9∗∗ 5550.3 6263.5∗∗ 6900.9∗∗
(1880.1) (2889.6) (2224.6) (2373.0)
Few Assets −9342.2∗∗ −7842.5 −4773.6 −6454.0
(3103.5) (4638.7) (3881.7) (3873.6)
Atlantic 11998.7∗∗ 16103.8∗∗ 4794.3 19385.8∗∗∗
(4543.4) (5840.1) (4211.7) (4188.2)
Quebec 14534.7∗∗∗ 17169.8∗∗∗ 21978.9∗∗∗ 15732.9∗∗∗
(3805.1) (4484.5) (3492.9) (3118.7)
Ont 18223.9∗∗∗ 20262.6∗∗∗ 19433.0∗∗∗ 23224.1∗∗∗
(4077.1) (4677.4) (3605.4) (3256.8)
Prairies 20325.8∗∗∗ 25493.9∗∗∗ 20338.8∗∗∗ 19530.0∗∗∗
(3979.8) (5151.5) (3874.5) (3842.6)
BC 10147.2∗ 17483.9∗∗ 14353.6∗∗ 11984.6∗∗
(4713.5) (5501.6) (4346.8) (4159.7)
Observations 571 844 822 651
Adjusted R2 0.844 0.732 0.829 0.821
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.2: Projected Income: Median and Mean
Age Group Period Median Mean Mean/Median
24-34 2005 26917 26947 1.001
1st Quarter 28717 28751 1.001
2nd Quarter 31150 30965 0.994
3rd Quarter 31398 31443 1.001
4th Quarter 30899 30948 1.002
35-44 2005 29925 29993 1.002
1st Quarter 33594 33495 0.997
2nd Quarter 37461 36889 0.985
3rd Quarter 38339 38381 1.001
4th Quarter 38682 38743 1.002
45-54 2005 29860 29666 0.994
1st Quarter 31225 31269 1.001
2nd Quarter 33554 33425 0.996
3rd Quarter 34866 34811 0.998
4th Quarter 34183 34252 1.002
55-64 2005 39596 39512 0.998
1st Quarter 42003 42460 1.011
2nd Quarter 46658 46338 0.993
3rd Quarter 47239 47393 1.003
4th Quarter 46622 46651 1.001
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B.2 Data Sources
Table B.3: Data Sources
Variable Source
Unemployment Cansim Table 282-0087, Table 282-0001
Average of Bank rate Cansim - Table 176-0043
Consumer loan rate Cansim - Table 176-0043
Mortgage lending rate - 5 year Cansim - Table 176-0043
Prime Business Rate Cansim - Table 176-0043
Consumer credit Cansim - Table 378-0051
Mortgages credit Cansim - Table 378-0051
Liabilities Consumer + Mortgages
Disposable Income Cansim - Table 380-0019, Table 384-0035
Credit Card Delinquencies CBA
Population Cansim Table 051-0026, Table 051-0001
Insolvency Rate OSB
Bankruptcies OSB, Cansim Table 177-0001, 177-0003, ?
Assets and Liabilities of Bankruptcy Filers Cansim Table 177-0001, 177-0003
Senior Loan Officer Survey Bank of Canada
U.S. Senior Loan Office Survey US Board of Governors
Housing Prices Teranet
CPI Cansim 176-0003
Weekly Effective Interest Rate Bank of Canada
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Appendix C
Chapter 4 Data Sources
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Table C.1: Data Sources
Variable Source Note
GDP BEA Real, Billions
Personal Disposable Income BEA Nominal, Billions
Unemployment Rate BLS
Employment Rate BLS
Population Census Resident Population
Households Statistical Abstracts Thousands
CPI (Urban US) BLS
Bankruptcy Filings ABI
Revolving & Nonrevolving Credit BOG -G19 Millions
Interest Rate BOG -G19 Annual
Charge-off rates, credit card FDIC
Delinquencies, credit card BoG - FFIEC
Federal fund rate BOG - H15
Consumption BEA Billions
LIBOR IMF-IFS 3 Month
3 Month T-Bills BOG - H15
Treasury securities BOG - H15 5 year
Consumer Liabilities BOG Z.1 Nominal
Mortgage Liabilities BOG Z.1 Nominal
185
Currirculum Vitae
Name: David Eric Fieldhouse
Place of Birth: Guelph, Ontario
Year of Birth: 1981
Post-Secondary The University of Guelph
Education and Guelph, Ontario
Degrees: 2000-2004 B.COM.
2004-2005 B.A.
2005–2006 M.Sc.
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
2007–2008 M.A.
2008–2014 Ph.D.
Honors and The University of Guelph
Awards: Entrance Scholarship, 2000
Dean’s List, 2000-2005
Dean’s Scholarship, 2002
College of Physical and Engineering Science Society of Excellence,
2005
The University of Western Ontario
Western Graduate Research Scholarship, 2007-2012
Ontario Graduate Scholarship, 2008
Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS Doctoral Scholarship, 2009-2012
186
Related Work Research Assistant
Experience: The University of Guelph
2003, 2004
Teaching Assistant
The University of Guelph
2005-2006
Teaching Assistant
The University of Western Ontario
2008–2011
Research Assistant
The University of Western Ontario
2009, 2011-2012
Instructor
The University of Western Ontario
2011
Senior Economist
Moody’s Analytics
2013-present
